1st Battalion, 294th Infantry Regiment, Guam National Guard soldiers look to assist a woman robbed in a peacekeeping scenario as part of Exercise *Garuda Shield 09*, at the Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan Darat, or Indonesian Army, Infantry Training Center in Bandung Indonesia. *Garuda Shield* was a two week exercise to bring together Soldiers and Marines from nine Nations to train on the UN-mandated ground-level tasks. *Garuda Shield* is a continuing series of exercises designed to promote regional peace and security. Training focuses on peace support operations and Global Peace Operation Initiative Certification, a Command Post Exercise, a Field Training Exercise and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Projects. Photo by the U.S. Army.

Brig. Gen. Hugh Van Roosen receives an on-site briefing by a Chinese commander with the UN Mission in Liberia, Monrovia, Liberia, August 17, 2013. Van Roosen, a U.S. Army Civil Affairs Officer, is the first U.S. general officer to serve with a United Nations field mission since the 1990s. Photo by the U.S. Army.

Congressmen Adam Kinzinger (R-IL), U.S. Representative for Illinois' 16th congressional district, and David Cicilline (D-RI), U.S. Representative for Rhode Island's 1st congressional district, brief Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf about their visit to Liberia in November 2013, supported by the Better World Campaign. Photo courtesy of TLC Africa.
Roundtable Report

Civil Affairs Roundtable XIX
Military Support to Peacebuilding

George Mason University Peace Operations Policy Program
The Reserve Officers Association
The Alliance for Peacebuilding

In coordination with
The Civil Affairs Association
The Foreign Area Officer Association (FAOA)
United Nations Association of the USA-
National Capital Area Peace and Security Committee

And
The Better World Campaign (BWC)

Thursday, 14 November 2013

Report Date: 24 February 2014
Roundtable Report

Civil Affairs Roundtable XIX

Military Support to Peacebuilding

Written by
Jeffrey Hoffmann
Co-Director, Peace & Security Committee
United Nations Association of the United States of America
National Capital Area Chapter

Edited by
Christopher Holshek
Co-Director, Peace & Security Committee
United Nations Association of the United States of America
National Capital Area Chapter
and
Senior Fellow, Alliance for Peacebuilding

Design and layout by
Ursala Knudsen-Latta, Alliance for Peacebuilding

Send comments and inquiries to: Holshek@allianceforepeacebuilding.org
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U.S. support to peacebuilding activities dates back to the Korean Conflict. Pictured left is a photo from July 13, 1952 - General J. Lawton Collins (front seat) Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and other top UN commanders drive by jeep to inspect observation posts of the Korean Western Front. In back seat (left to right) General Mark W. Clark, Commander in Chief, UN Command (CINCUNC); General James A. Van Fleet, CG Eighth US Army; and Major General Paul W. Kendall, CG I US Corps. Driver is SFC Warren B. Purcell (Anderson, Ind.) U.S. Army photo by PVT Hanson Williams, 226th Sig. Sv. Co.

This photo along with a UN Flag and other General Van Fleet artifacts are on display in the FAO Heritage Pentagon exhibit and were graciously donated by the Virginia Military Institute George C. Marshall Foundation.
Foreword

As peacebuilding moves to the forefront of peace and security activities worldwide, how is – or how should – the role of the U.S. military be evolving to this challenge? How do peacebuilding actors view how the military fits into a “whole of society” effort to address “human security” concerns? What is the way ahead on civil-military coordination in peacebuilding?

These are questions a distinguish group of policymakers, practitioners, and scholars in the field began to address at last November’s Civil Affairs Roundtable on “Military Support to Peacebuilding” at George Mason University’s Arlington Campus just outside Washington, D.C.

The military plays a vital enabling role in the transition from conflict to peace in the protection of civilians, humanitarian assistance, support to civil authority, and security sector assistance – whether these be in post-conflict stability operations or in emerging conflict prevention operations.

However, there are significant challenges to ensuring military efforts towards mitigating and defeating threats to stability do not find themselves at cross-purposes with the efforts of peacebuilders to reduce and eliminate the drivers of conflict to begin with. The military in general and Civil Affairs in particular need to gain familiarity and operational understanding of peacebuilding concepts, policies, and practices in order to maximize the effectiveness of our comprehensive effort while minimizing the demand for military forces to reach these common goals.

With regard to fostering that all-important steady state dialogue, I believe this Roundtable, as this report explains, was an important step in that direction. But there are many more to be taken. Among these will be the next Roundtable looking at “More than Monuments Men: Supporting Governance in the 21st Century” on March 21, 2014, as well as subsequent Roundtables every spring and fall.

Our sincere thanks go to George Mason University's Peace Operations Policy Program and the Reserve Officers Association for hosting the Roundtables, as well as our partners from the Civil Affairs Association, Foreign Area OfficerAssociation, the UN Association of the USA National Capital Area Chapter, and the Better World Campaign for co-sponsoring these highly important discussions.

And, of course, our profound thanks to Christopher Holshek and Jeffrey Hoffmann for organizing the Roundtables and writing this Report.

Melanie Greenberg
President & CEO
The Alliance for Peacebuilding

“No foreign policy-no matter how ingenious-has any chance of success if it is born in the minds of few and carried in the hearts of many.”

-Former Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Peacebuilding has been a familiar concept internationally, starting with the United Nations in the early 1990’s. According to the 2008 UN Principles & Guidelines, or “Capstone Doctrine,” peacebuilding is defined as

“a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. [It] is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works by addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that affect the functioning of society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions.”

This past November 14th, the George Mason University Peace Operations Policy Program, Reserve Officers Association, Alliance for Peacebuilding, Civil Affairs Association, Foreign Area Officer Association, Better World Campaign, and UN Association of the USA DC Chapter Peace and Security Committee hosted the 19th Civil Affairs Roundtable on “Military Support to Peacebuilding” at George Mason University’s Arlington Campus. The goal of this Roundtable was to initiate a steady-state dialogue between the civilian-led peacebuilding community, represented in the first panel, and the military-led security community, represented in the second, in bridging conceptual, policy, and practical gaps in comprehensive approaches to peacebuilding that linked the two interests. One thing that became clear from the two panels was that the difference between international peacebuilding and U.S. stability operations was not merely a matter of semantics or definitions. Peacebuilding is essentially aimed at addressing the human security needs of communities to transform conflict itself, whereas stability operations tend to look more at state-building and security sector efforts to defeat threats.

This forum also aimed to better introduce the precursory concepts of conflict prevention along with other socio-economic development initiatives including more focus on reintegration policy in addition to U.S. military investments such as the U.S. Military Observer Group – Washington (USMOG-W) and another keystone program known as the National Guard Bureau State Partnership Program (SPP).

The Roundtable began with a message from each of the sponsors followed by a keynote presentation from Vietnam War veteran Albert Santoli titled, “From Warrior to Peacebuilder.” Santoli pointed out that, “Civil Affairs are and should consist of the most courageous and competent soldiers you have, because they have to go to places and understand and do things that most other soldiers do not.” As a soldier, historian, journalist, an advisor to the U.S. Congress, a human rights monitor, and foreign policy expert covering complex conflict areas like Cambodia, Afghanistan, Tibet, and Burma, Santoli is a rare example of a longtime peacebuilder who has made the transition from soldiering. He is currently the founder and President of the Asia America Initiative, best-selling author and nominee for both the Pulitzer Prize and American Book Award for History.

The remainder of the forum was divided into two panels that represented both senior U.S. civilian and military leadership including Brigadier General Hugh Van Roosen, the most recent Chief of Staff for the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), currently the Deputy Commander, U.S. Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command as well as the Director of the new Institute for Military Support to Governance at the U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare School and Center at Fort Bragg, NC. Additionally, two guests joined the conversation from the UN, Mr. Stan Nkwain, Head of Policy and Planning, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery at the UN Development Program (UNDP) and Mr. Ned Kostov, Special Advisor to the UN Under Secretary-General and Chief for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).
The first panel focused on the civilian perspective of peacebuilding including the following participants:

- Dr. Lisa Schirch, Alliance for Peacebuilding, Director of Human Security;
- Mr. Stan Nkwain, UNDP, Head of Policy and Planning, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
- Mr. Raphael Carland, Department of State, Director for Partnerships, Bureau of Conflict & Stabilization Operations (CSO);
- Mr. Greg Hermsmeyer, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Center for Civil-Military Cooperation Chief, Operations, Learning and Outreach; and,
- Dr. Theodore Feifer, U.S. Institute of Peace, Senior Program Officer, Academy for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding.

Moderated by President and CEO of the Alliance for Peacebuilding, Melanie Greenberg, this panel began with a presentation by Dr. Schirch. She provided a foundational base for the roundtable that defined the different layers of peacebuilding, which are not stability operations and is a strategic whole-of-society beginning at the community level rather than the whole-of-government approach; and secondly, peacebuilding aims to improve human security, much closer to the root causes of conflict. Dr. Schirch also identified the distinction between peacekeeping and stabilization; and highlighted four pillars of military support to peacebuilding (Table 1).

According to Dr. Schirch, peacebuilding:

- Works in a range of contexts from latent conflict to intense warfare at the top, middle and community level;
- Involves multiple actors at the top, middle and community level of society – including government, religious, business, educational, tribal and other civilian leaders as well as, in some cases, the security sector – and requiring insider leadership and the “whole-of-society”; 
- Is locally defined human security as measured by the perceptions of local people;
- Utilizes dialogue and coordination platforms that allow diverse stakeholders to communicate with each other to identify shared interests and key differences to develop complementary efforts including multiple sectors such as humanitarian assistance, political dialogue, economic development, justice, security sector reform, psycho-social healing, etc.;
- Emphasizes persuasive approaches that address root causes of conflict and deigns to use coercive means to force change – they are unsustainable and create negative 2nd- 3rd order impacts; and
- Uses short-term programs to support long-term efforts with a 10-20 year timeline.
UNDP comments followed with a leading statement from Stan Nkwain that asked the question, “What is the role of the UNDP?” He highlighted the development of the Crisis Prevention Division twelve years ago, which has expanded into the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR).

However, despite formal efforts and legitimate programs, Nkwain emphasized that peacebuilding is subject to political agendas that highly influence the development of goals and objectives. He also discussed the UN definition of peacebuilding, with origins in the 1970s through Johan Galtung’s work for the creation of peacebuilding structures to promote sustainable peace by addressing the “root causes” of violent conflict and supporting indigenous capacities for peace management and conflict resolution. Galtung is considered the founder of the field of peace and conflict studies. While less emphasis should be noted on the title of his book, The Fall of the U.S. Empire—And Then What, more importantly, like he did with the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, he predicts an American republic will survive and possibly blossom, but an American empire and its foreign policy will essentially no longer be able to sustain and/or afford conflicts in multiple regions beyond 2020.

There is an international, albeit not universal definition of peacebuilding. In 2007, the UN Secretary-General's Policy Committee agreed on the following conceptual basis for peacebuilding to inform international practice. The international definition of peacebuilding thus reads:

“Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.”

Table 1. The Pillars of Military Support to Peacebuilding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indirect and Infrastructure Support for Humanitarian Assistance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military forces support peacebuilding when they respond to civilian requests for indirect assistance such as transporting relief supplies, infrastructure and medical support, and other logistical matters including airspace/port management, water purification, road and facility construction or power generation to support humanitarian efforts. The Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) guidance on Military and Civil Defense Assets (MCDA) concluded that military forces should not, in principal, provide direct assistance as this can create confusion of civilian and military personnel and projects and increase risks opposing armed groups will target civilians.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<th>Protection of Civilians</th>
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<tr>
<td>Military forces contribute to peacebuilding when they focus on protection of civilians. While the U.S. military has made important advances in preventing civilian casualties, more training in protection of civilians is needed, as this is a distinctly different skill than merely eliminating threats through targeted killing. Military strategies to enhance the protection of civilians therefore rely on more robust multi-stakeholder dialogue with civilian populations to listen to their perceptions and interests in improving their safety.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Peacekeeping and Support to Civil Authority</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military forces contribute to peacebuilding when they take more of a peacebuilding approach themselves, by ensuring that all humanitarian, stability, and peacekeeping related activities should be executed by, with, and through civilian authorities and institutions – international, U.S., and host nation. This would include supporting criminal justice procedures and methods that apprehend rather than kill perpetrators of violence, as this reinforces democratic processes and legitimacy of governing institutions and avoids the 2nd and 3rd order negative impacts that may come from use of deadly force.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<th>Security Sector Assistance</th>
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<tr>
<td>Too often security sector assistance undermines peacebuilding including respect to the three essential elements required: national ownership, national capacity, and a common strategy. U.S. Military forces contribute to peacebuilding by demonstrating the primacy of civil authority in security assistance activities outlined in Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 23 (Appendix A, PPD 23 Fact Sheet).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Nkwain, peacebuilding results due to failures in development. This supports BCPR’s designated lead role for early recovery efforts and projects (Table 2).

He emphasized that the lack of funding and resources creates issues, the perception of “military” in peacebuilding activities is not positive in all environments, and the overall nature of conflict has changed highlighting the example of organized criminal networks that lead to conflict and state failure.

Nkwain’s words were further reinforced by Raphael Carland of the Department of State who said the changing nature of conflict is the result of more varied cases combined with diverse kinds of violence in addition to the rise in popular street demonstrations that have the potential to trigger violence and bring down regimes. This was the type of violence witnessed in several countries since the first Arab Spring uprisings in North Africa beginning in Tunisia and Egypt.

Furthermore, Carland said new threats require U.S. responses to be 1) Urgent, with the capability to mobilize and deploy resources quickly, which is the goal of the Civilian Response Corps and network, 2) Concrete, enabling the delivery of tangible benefits in the short term, and 3) Broadly Impactful, to include the development of successful catalytic programs that affect large numbers of people.

Carland used the case study of Syria, where CSO has developed a network of more than 2,000 Syrian activists, provided over 5,000 pieces of equipment, completed an estimated 488 hours of training to 431 representatives of 198 civilian organizations, and established a secure communications capacity. He finalized his presentation with an overview of CSO’s criteria for prioritized country engagement and noted that each country or regional conflict area is on a case-by-case basis.

This was an ideal opening for USAID’s Greg Hermsmeyer who identified conflict analysis as the first step in the peacebuilding development cycle. To further support Carland’s belief that the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) did not focus on “security and justice,” Hermsmeyer

Table 2. UNDP and Early Recovery Fact Sheet Summary

Building resilience to conflicts and disasters is at the very heart of UNDP’s work. UNDP helps countries prevent armed conflict, alleviate the risk and effects of disasters from natural hazards and build back better and stronger when crises happen. When a crisis strikes, UNDP ensures that while the humanitarian response focuses on the immediate lifesaving needs of a population, those responsible also work towards longer-term development objectives. This approach is known as early recovery.

In 2005, as part of the reform of the international humanitarian system, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (IASC) assigned UNDP as cluster lead for early recovery. Based on the UNDP Early Recovery Fact Sheet, there are two levels. At the global level, UNDP leads the Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery (CWGER) which focuses on four main lines of action:

1. Providing direct strategic and coordination support to Humanitarian Coordinators (H Cs), Resident Coordinators (RCs), Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, Humanitarian Country Teams (HCTs) and Cluster Lead Agencies at the country level;

2. Defining and coordinating early recovery work that is not covered by other clusters (e.g. governance, non-agricultural livelihoods); Humanitarian intervention is an obligation of the international community when the impact of a crisis outstrips the capacity of the national authorities to respond adequately. Immediate action is essential to save lives, but there is a wider recognition amongst humanitarian and development actors that early recovery is a vital part of the response. It is critical in allowing the gains of humanitarian action to be more sustainable, to provide a foundation for resilience, and to ensure continuity towards longer-term development objectives. UNDP supports the early recovery agenda through its leadership of the global cluster on early recovery; its coordination role at the country level; and its programming approach.

3. Providing initiative and guidance on the integration of early recovery in the work of other clusters, and inter-cluster coordination of early recovery; and

4. Influencing the global policy agenda on humanitarian financing, civilian capacities, and strategic planning to strengthen the potential for, and impact of early recovery within international crisis response and recovery efforts.

At the country level, UNDP helps HC/RCs and the HCT to integrate early recovery approaches into the humanitarian response through the deployment of Early Recovery Advisors (ERAs). ERAs work across the humanitarian community, and help develop common strategies to strengthen the links between relief, recovery and development – including in needs assessments, appeals and the work of all clusters. UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) maintains an inter-agency roster for quick ERA deployment on behalf of the CWGER. More background on the BCPR and their investments and initiatives can be reviewed at the website below.

www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery
introduced the *New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States*. Also known as The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, the New Deal was one of the building blocks formed during the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4) which took place in Busan, Korea in November-December 2011. More details about the New Deal are summarized in the recommendations below including how each of the New Deal’s Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) can be further advocated including integration with the UNDP’s Post 2015 Development Agenda.²

Hermsmeyer concluded by asking, “What is the role of the military in the New Deal?” Dr. Ted Feifer of the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) also questioned the military aspect and proposed a debate to revive the Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) policy and doctrine, which according to research, the update to Joint Pub 3-07 for MOOTW was 1995. Feifer concluded his presentation with an overview of USIP organization, missions, past and upcoming projects to include several examples of Security Sector Reform activities in Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia.

**New Horizon Progress: Keynote Luncheon with the UN DPKO Special Advisor**

Joining the Roundtable for a luncheon keynote, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations Special Advisor, Mr. Ned Kostov (pictured right) provided an informative overview of DPKO organization in addition to current missions. Given the emergence of “multidimensional peacekeeping” laid out in UN Security Council Resolution 2086, which describes peacekeeping as “early peacebuilding,” Kostov’s discussion served as a bridge between the morning panel composed largely of professional peacebuilders and the afternoon panel comprised mainly of U.S. national security professionals. Kostov’s own perspective of peacebuilding emphasized that, while both occur in parallel, peacekeeping is separate from peacebuilding. Kostov described DPKO’s peacekeeping contributions in these three areas of interaction:

- Supporting the political process such as advocacy and passage of a security council resolution that prepares and makes an environment conducive for peacebuilding;
- Assisting peacebuilding missions with varied jobs using equipment procurement practices and solutions and logistics as examples; and,
- Engaging themselves in actual peacebuilding tasks like military observer missions to monitor local security forces and the protection of civilians.

Kostov concluded that peacebuilding and peacekeeping are irreversible, prompted the topic of “conflict transformation” for future discussion, and stressed the important factor in conflict transformation is funding and future impacts of diminished troop contributions guided by Article 17 of the UN Charter.

Hermsmeyer and Feifer’s earlier comments set the stage for the second panel, which focused on the military perspective of peacebuilding. Participants included:

- Mr. R. David Stephenson, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Chief, Irregular Warfare Assessment & Integration, J-7 Joint Force Development;
- Colonel Eric Haaland, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Civil Affairs Policy, Office of Partnership Strategy & Stability Operations;
- Brigadier General Hugh Van Roosen, U.S. Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command, Deputy Commander and former Military Chief of Staff, United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL);
- Colonel Rob Smullen, U.S. Marine Corps, Director, Small Wars Center for Irregular Warfare Integration Division (SWCIWID); and,

Moderated by Alliance for Peacebuilding Senior Fellow and “Blue Helmet” veteran retired U.S. Army Colonel Christopher Holshek, the panel began with a comparison of UN and U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) peacebuilding definitions. David Stephenson highlighted that current fiscal realities are forcing the Services to make hard choices and focus on readiness and maintaining core competencies; resource constraints will challenge the ability to take on tasks or missions outside the “core” portfolio of the Joint Force. He deduced the Joint Force has thus clearly placed “peacebuilding” outside the sphere of U.S. national military strategy goals and objectives, which leads to the core recommendation for DoD generated from the Roundtable; namely:

*the need for a comprehensive approach to issues as they relate to peacebuilding and statebuilding, framed in integrated regional and country plans with an appropriate and updated civil-military conflict assessment and analysis, planning, and overall unity of purpose that includes sustainable host nation rule of law and other governance as well as civil society structures.*

Brigadier General Hugh Van Roosen joined via Skype, and continued advocacy for the framework of this recommendation describing his new position including two areas of focus he has been asked to accomplish and lead as Deputy Commander of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command. These include an assessment of transitional military authorities and to conduct a complete joint review of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) for PPD-23 security sector assistance activities including peacebuilding and peacekeeping.

General Van Roosen talked about his experience as the Military Chief of Staff for UNMIL, noting that “utilization of the military as part of peacekeeping certainly works pretty well.” While in Liberia, General Van Roosen had close to 9,000 Blue Helmet personnel on mission, including Chinese troops. He discussed examples of using the various aspects of DOTMLPF-P to carry out
peacekeeping activities such as the development of an operational order for a national level quick response riot control force.

General Van Roosen highlighted some of the issues he encountered, most notably the cultural differences. He said, “[he] had to learn to do things the UN way,” especially with respect to foreign military cultures vice traditional U.S. military ways. General Van Roosen provided several more comments identified in the recommendations section of this report. He concluded by proposing the challenge of standardization, specifically noting a need to develop standardized doctrine/Training, Tactics, and Procedures (TTP) prior to engaging in building partnership capacity (BPC) activities.

Colonel Haaland echoed General Van Roosen in saying that U.S. military culture is resistant to peacebuilding and peacekeeping (clearly demonstrated in DoD’s decision to create its own definition of peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Joint Publication 3-07.3 rather than simply adopting the universal definition of these activities). He closed his comments by introducing a new topic asking if corporate outsourcing of defense-related capabilities was becoming the way of the future. He questioned whether the use of contractors would be more cost effective than use of military personnel. In comparison, according to a GAO report, for peacekeeping alone the dispatch of UN peacekeepers to Haiti was eight times less expensive than fielding a comparable U.S. mission.

Colonel Smullen agreed that tightening budgets in the upcoming years is also impacting the U.S. Marine Corps. Despite these issues, he announced the venerable USMC Small Wars Manual was being updated as well as noted several other Security Cooperation initiatives including the rewrite of the USMC Campaign Support Plan (CSP) for FY14.

Combined with the CSP Col Smullen noted three additional reference documents that define the USMC’s Title 10 responsibilities for security cooperation to include USMC Order 5710.6A; Marine Corps Instructional Publication 3-33.03; and the Security Cooperation Training and Regulation Manual. As Director of the USMC Small Wars Center for Irregular Warfare Integration Division, he is responsible for developing capabilities and identifying divergences, gaps, and seams across the DOTMLPF spectrum. Later addressed in the recommendations section of this Report, a U.S. policy document like the DoD 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is the appropriate means to incorporate more focused New Deal related language including cost-saving program enhancements like conflict prevention. U.S. policies like the QDR would further influence and guide Service directives and instruction including USMC Security Cooperation.

Panel 2 concluded with final remarks from Colonel Thomas Moffatt who introduced the U.S. military organization most interconnected with UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding known as the U.S. Military Observer Group-Washington (USMOG-W). Established on October 1, 1993, USMOG-W provides command authority, force management and administrative support to the U.S. military personnel assigned in UN Military...
Observer missions. The Secretary of the Army (G-3/5/7) is the DoD Executive Agent. The goal of USMOG-W is to implement DoD policy regarding personnel, logistics, administration, and force protection oversight (including pre-deployment training) for U.S. personnel deployed to UN peacekeeping missions, and also serve as staff agent for DoD policies for the Multinational Force and Observers, Sinai, Egypt.

As of November 2013, in addition to UN Headquarters in New York, approximately 31 U.S. DoD personnel were deployed to Haiti (MINUSTAH), Kenya (UNMAS), Liberia (UNMIL), Israel (UNTSO), Democratic Republic Congo (MONUSCO), and South Sudan (UNMISS). The MINUSMA mission in Mali was still pending approval after the UN requested 10 U.S. staff officers.

Colonel Moffatt concluded by highlighting the uniqueness of the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) community and the FAO’s role in UN programs and initiatives. A FAO himself, he noted that the Services were very supportive of Phase 0 (Shape and Influence) capacity building mission - so much that from 2008 to present, the U.S. Army had increased the number of FAO colonels from about 190 to over 250, with several of them supporting security sector assistance type missions. Because of the FAO language, cultural, and regional expertise, Colonel Moffatt said FAOs serve as the optimal U.S. military liaisons between the UN and other international organizations and agencies such as the State Department.

Celebrating 20 Years of Success for USMOG-W

Following a brief question and answer session with the audience, one closing comment succinctly stated, “The UN is a key element. We need to better integrate.” Later on, a reception honored and recognized USMOG-W’s 20th Anniversary. U.S. House of Representative Jim Moran (8th District, Virginia) reinforced the need to better integrate. He also viewed lack of U.S. participation as a possible threat to national security highlighting recent increases in peacekeeping activity and contributions from the People’s Republic of China, which he viewed as competition. Mr. Ned Kostov from the UN DPKO also offered respectful remarks to Colonel Moffatt and USMOG-W stating, “We’ve heard of you, we know you’re out there and are appreciative of what you’re doing for the UN.”
To reiterate, the requirements summary below captures a core theme generated from the Roundtable; namely, the need for:

“A comprehensive approach to issues as they relate to peacebuilding and statebuilding, framed in integrated regional and country plans with an appropriate and updated civil-military conflict assessment and analysis, planning, and overall unity of purpose that includes sustainable host nation rule of law and other governance as well as civil society structures.”

Too often forums like this come and go with words and ideas that fall silent with no opportunity for action. Instead, the level of effort required for this type of conflict transformation reform was best stated by former U.S. Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger: “No foreign policy-no matter how ingenious-has any chance of success if it is born in the minds of few and carried in the hearts of many.”

This leads to the following three recommendations:

1. Integrate international peacebuilding concepts and language and appropriate U.S. Government policy goals and objectives across the Department of Defense, in order for the Joint Force to support rather than execute peacekeeping and peacebuilding tasks.

After a review of the 2010 QDR, while support to peacekeeping operations is highlighted, the document does not include the words: peacebuilding, conflict prevention, or reintegration. At a minimum, the rewrite of the 2014 QDR in-sync with the Department of State Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) should include specific language that implements and initiates roadmap development in support of both PPD-23 and “study/consultative-and host level” participation in the UN Post 2015 Development Agenda, specifically the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States that fully accommodates the following peacebuilding and statebuilding goals (PSGs).

PSG 1: Legitimate Politics

Foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution. Many fragile states, especially post-conflict ones, already face the arduous task of building trust in the state, and public attitudes on the processes that PSG 1 outlines are oftentimes considered to be skeptical at best. As a feature of existing and potential power structures in society, crime has considerable implications for legitimacy. Legitimacy in these contexts stems as much from the health of the state-society relationship as it does from the strength of the state’s capacity.

- Political settlement – diversity in and perception of representation, and its effectiveness, as well as the proportion of provisions in the settlement that are honored and implemented;
- Political processes and institutions – participation in elections and processes, as well as the level of satisfaction with the quality and possibility of participation; and
- Societal relationships – the number of inter-group disputes resolved by dialogue and/or mediation, as well as the level of trust among people, including between formerly conflicting groups.

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PSG 2: Security

**Establish and strengthen people’s security.** The relationship between crime and violence is not straightforward. It depends on context-specific variables, including interactions between criminal groups and communities; links to and/or approach of the security forces and government authorities; and the levels of competition between various criminal interests and enterprises.

- Security conditions – including violent deaths, assaults, sexual violence, cross-border violence and internal displacement. This also includes the redefining of criminal activities such as the comparison of terror-based leadership to other most wanted crime bosses and drug lords on the world’s INTERPOL watch list. It is time to ask the question, “how is a criminal terror network using religion as a base different from the Sicilian Mafia, American Cosa Nostra, Neapolitan Camorra, ‘Ndrangheta, Russian Mafia, Albanian Mafia, Chinese Triads, Japanese Yakuza, Montreal Mob, Solntsevskaya Bratva, Clerkenwell crime syndicate, Los Rastrojos, Sinaloa Cartel, and the Juárez Cartel?” Religions and faith are not a weapon, instead they are the blessed and sacred right of an individual, which equates to hope and security;
- The population’s perception of security conditions;
- The capacity and accountability of the police and the authorities assigned to monitor police performance; and
- The population’s confidence in the police and the perception of corruption of the security forces.

PSG 3: Justice

**Address injustices and increase people’s access to justice.** In fragile and conflict-affected countries, government justice institutions are often relatively new and untested. Similar to the security sector with which they are inherently linked, they are still in need of gaining the confidence of the public. These institutions face the daunting task of increasing both judicial access and capacity, sensitizing the public to legal procedures, and overcoming any ethnic, religious or gender bias.

- Justice conditions – the level of trust in the formal and customary justice systems and the ratio of lawyers to total cases;
- The capacity and accountability of justice institutions – the ratio of public officials tried and convicted to reported cases, the budget allocated to the justice sector as a proportion of total government expenditure, access to the justice system by the general population, and the number of judges; and
- The performance and responsiveness of justice institutions – the population’s perception of performance and general awareness of legal and human rights.

PSG 4: Economic Foundations

**Generate employment and improve livelihoods.** While it is impossible to isolate specific conditions that directly lead to criminal activity, it is believed that the existence of certain structural factors such as ‘high unemployment, high income inequality, prior exposure to violence, democratic collapse, low gross domestic product and weak institutional capacity do contribute to a country’s vulnerability.

- Productive resources and prospects for growth – including access to infrastructure, income inequality among regions and economic diversification;
- Jobs, livelihoods and private sector development – including level of employment, number of new businesses and the share of food in household expenditure; and
- Natural resource management – including the ratio of local/foreign employment, the existence and quality of the regulatory framework, and perception of participation in and benefits from natural resources.

PSG 5: Revenues and Services

**Manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery.** Limited and uneven access to services is a ‘defining characteristic’ of fragile and conflict affected countries.

- Revenues – state monopoly over and capacity to undertake tax collection, the proportion of tax revenue and how the state’s tax efforts are perceived;
- Public administration – the quality of financial management and internal oversight mechanisms, the budget execution rate, the number of public officials sanctioned for corruption, and the population’s perception of the links between corruption and service delivery; and
- Service delivery – quality standards, social spending, the distribution of services, access to services and public satisfaction with service delivery.
2. Continue to conduct a complete assessment and review across the DOTMLPF-P spectrum ensuring transparent and interagency linkages with the Department of Defense, in particular the capabilities of the Joint Force to engage multilaterally and support peacekeeping/peacebuilding.

While under the mantra, “policy drives action,” the 2014 QDR revisions would certainly address the “-P” in this spectrum. However, there are other organizational, doctrinal, training including facilities for experimentation, and personnel/force posture tools and factors including Guidance for the Employment of Force (GEF) impacts if peacebuilding integration is accepted by senior DoD leaders. There are also existing tools like GMU-POPP’s Conceptual Model of Peace Operations (CMPO) that can be leveraged to shape appropriate DOTMLPF in all areas of peacemaking, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and peace support.

Additionally, there are other policy disconnects with international doctrine, especially with respect to organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Association for Southeast Asian Nations, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the European Union. Since the Brahimi Report that began the reform of peacekeeping, DPKO has produced a series of documents, beginning with the UN Handbook on Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations in 2003. Later in 2008, the UN Peacekeeping Operations Principles & Guidelines (“Capstone doctrine”), which established guiding principles and core objectives of UN Peacekeeping operations, as well the main factors contributing to their success in the field including lessons learned. Other documents published by DPKO that could inform the development of standardized U.S. DOTMLPF-P reviews are highlighted in Table 3.

### Table 3. Evolution of UN DPKO Plans and Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>2009–2010</td>
<td><strong>A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping.</strong> The New Horizon Initiative: Progress Report No. 1 was the first informal progress report. These internal documents, prepared as part of the “New Horizon” process attempt to assess the major policy and strategy dilemmas facing UN Peacekeeping today and over the coming years; and to reinvigorate the ongoing dialogue with Member States and other stakeholders on possible solutions to better calibrate UN Peacekeeping to meet current and future requirements. Progress Report No. 2 was published in 2011 and highlighted ongoing efforts to improve the effectiveness of UN Peacekeeping.</td>
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| 2011 | **Defense Sector Reform (DSR) Policy.** Provided guidance to UN staff engaged in supporting national defense sector reform efforts. The DSR policy has been developed within the overarching framework of the United Nations security sector reform framework intended to support States and societies in developing effective, inclusive and accountable security institutions. |

| 2012 | **Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration: report of the Secretary-General.** introduced revised policy and guidance related to the UN approach to the reintegration of ex-combatants and associated groups, and noting large gaps in their implementation [A/65/741] of 21 March 2011. Prior to this report, the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was produced in 2006, which expands the inventory of documentation and cooperation beyond UN DPKO. In addition to the UN Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force efforts, other offices of integration could include the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and UN Office on Drugs and Control (UNDOC). |

| 2013 | **Planning Toolkit.** Intended to help field practitioners in conducting assessments and planning of DPKO-led operations. It provides guidance, templates, checklists and lists of examples of good practices to help develop a wide variety of plans — ranging from a UN-wide Integrated Strategic Framework to the mission results-based budgeting and planning. |

| 2013 | **DPKO/Department of Field Support (DFS) Civil Affairs Handbook.** The first edition of the document providing detailed guidance for Civil Affairs Officers on how to perform their tasks; can be a useful orientation for anyone interested in finding out more about Civil Affairs work in UN peacekeeping. |

| 2013 | **Handbook for Judicial Affairs Officers in UN Peacekeeping Operations.** Intended to serve as a “textbook” for UN judicial affairs officers working in post-conflict environments and provide a reference guide for use prior to, and during, their deployment in the field. |

| 2013 | **Prison Incident Management Handbook.** To provide guidance to UN corrections officers and other partners that assist national prison authorities in addressing the many prison security challenges. |

However, for this to be accomplished appropriately, the UN must engage in the information sharing and be open to constructive criticism even if this leads to a recommendation to decrease and/or transition “legacy” mission areas. This is of particular interest to U.S. politicians, understandably, who often question the return on investment following America’s contributions to UN funding including peacekeeping activities (CIPA).

3. **Update and reestablish a base for country and regional conflict assessment using a coordinated State Fragility Index.**

This recommendation is at the heart of the New Deal PSGs and addresses another theme generated from the roundtable identified as, “Conflict Transformation.”

Specific to the New Deal, the International Dialogue in Busan, Korea made two primary commitments that support this recommendation, which include:

- Enabling country-led and owned transitions out of fragility through country-led fragility assessments, national visions and plans that focus on peace and statebuilding, and inclusive political dialogue. International partners commit to use country compacts as the frame for their collaboration in fragile countries; and

- Undertaking action to provide aid and use domestic resources more effectively in support of peace and statebuilding priorities, in the areas of transparency, predictability, risk management, capacity development and the use of country systems.

An ideal model was published by the Center for Systemic Peace titled the, “Global Report 2011: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility.” It is highly recommended that an updated Global Report be wholly integrated with the International Dialogue on the New Deal for Engagement of State Fragility and Post 2015 Development Agenda activities as they relate to conflict prevention, peacebuilding and statebuilding, and reintegration. In comparison to the implementation of the New Deal in the pilot countries of Afghanistan, Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Timor-Leste, below is an excerpt from the Global Report in 2011.

In conclusion, to repeat a comment during the roundtable, "It’s not about us; it’s about them." Opposite of U.S. military that is traditionally responsive to conflict after it happens, in security development activities in particular, actors should take a peacebuilding approach that promotes capacity development or what has become known in DoD circles as Building Partnership Capacity (BPC). However, complimentary to supplying a country with a foreign military sale or security training package, peacebuilding also equates to and demands local ownership of both the problems and the solutions, which begins with a shared conflict assessment; this means prioritizing (or sorting) U.S. vs. local national interests and objectives rather than simply concentrating on the former.

In both conflict prevention and peacebuilding, it is important to manage expectations constantly in civil-military coordination – tell each other about both capabilities and limitations in order to identify gap areas as well as areas of overlap or duplicity and minimize working at cross-purposes.

Civil Affairs and Foreign Area Officers including those who support U.S. organizations like USMOG-W are the most ideal Joint Force capabilities and activities to enhance peacebuilding as a means to mitigate and minimize the large-scale use of U.S. forces in particular and keep things in "Phase 0" rather than letting them drift into more advanced and expensive stages of conflict, or to more rapidly transition from conflict to peace. In the end, the latter is also not fiscally disciplined, subject to sunk cost syndrome addressed earlier in relation to Afghanistan and Iraq. In DoD terms, the bottom line is that Phase 0 (Shape and Influence) activities must more conscientiously integrate civilian-led peacebuilding and conflict prevention concepts, policy, and practices and clearly place the military in a supportive role in order to produce more cost-effective outcomes at lower risk and with a greater chance of success for true stability that rewards local populations with jobs, a judicial system to deter conflict "trigger effects," along with other socio-economic principles and institutions needed for communities to prosper safely. This, from a DoD perspective, is true strategic economy of force.
United States policy on Security Sector Assistance is aimed at strengthening the ability of the United States to help allies and partner nations build their own security capacity, consistent with the principles of good governance and rule of law. The United States has long recognized that the diversity and complexity of the threats to our national interest require a collaborative approach, both within the United States Government and among allies, partners, and multilateral organizations. More than ever before, we share security responsibilities with other nations and groups to help address security challenges in their countries and regions, whether it is fighting alongside our forces, countering terrorist and international criminal networks, participating in international peacekeeping operations, or building institutions capable of maintaining security, law, and order, and applying justice. U.S. assistance to build capabilities to meet these challenges can yield critical benefits, including reducing the possibility that the United States or partner nations may be required to intervene abroad in response to instability.

Effectively building security capacity requires multi-year investments, though such up-front costs are relatively small when compared to the larger political, economic, and societal costs in the event that local institutions flounder and instability ensues. While security sector assistance can yield significant benefits, the United States cannot build capacity in all countries. It is essential that we are selective and focus our targeted assistance where it can be effective and is in line with our broader foreign policy and national security objectives. Investments of such assistance are critical to better share the costs and responsibility of global leadership.

To address these challenges, the United States must improve its ability to enable partners in providing security and justice for their own people and responding to common security challenges. Therefore, the United States will pursue a new approach to security sector assistance to better meet this complex and interdependent security environment. This approach will align with the goals and guidelines outlined below.

The Definition of Security Sector Assistance

The security sector is composed of those institutions - to include partner governments and international organizations - that have the authority to use force to protect both the state and its citizens at home or abroad, to maintain international peace and security, and to enforce the law and provide oversight of those organizations and forces. It includes both military and civilian organizations and personnel operating at the international, regional, national, and sub-national levels. Security sector actors include state security and law enforcement providers, governmental security and justice management and oversight bodies, civil society, institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies, and non-state justice and security providers. Security sector assistance

“Together, we must learn how to compose differences, not with arms, but with intellect and decent purpose.”
-Dwight D. Eisenhower
refers to the policies, programs, and activities the United States uses to:

- Engage with foreign partners and help shape their policies and actions in the security sector;
- Help foreign partners build and sustain the capacity and effectiveness of legitimate institutions to provide security, safety, and justice for their people; and
- Enable foreign partners to contribute to efforts that address common security challenges.

Goals for U.S. Security Sector Assistance

The principal goals of our security sector assistance are to:

1. Help partner nations build sustainable capacity to address common security challenges, specifically to: disrupt and defeat transnational threats; sustain legitimate and effective public safety, security, and justice sector institutions; support legitimate self-defense; contribute to U.S. or partner military operations which may have urgent requirements; maintain control of their territory and jurisdictional waters including land, air, and sea borders; and help indigenous forces assume greater responsibility for operations where U.S. military forces are present.

2. Promote partner support for U.S. interests, through cooperation on national, regional, and global priorities, including, but not limited to, such areas as: military access to airspace and basing rights; improved interoperability and training opportunities; and cooperation on law enforcement, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, combating organized crime and arms trafficking, countering Weapons of Mass Destruction proliferation, and terrorism, intelligence, peacekeeping, and humanitarian efforts.

3. Promote universal values, such as good governance, transparent and accountable oversight of security forces, rule of law, transparency, accountability, delivery of fair and effective justice, and respect for human rights.

4. Strengthen collective security and multinational defense arrangements and organizations, including by helping to build the capacity of troop-contributing nations to United Nations and other multilateral peacekeeping missions, as well as through regional exercises, expert exchanges, and coordination of regional intelligence and law enforcement information exchanges.

Our assistance can also yield the benefit of the adoption of U.S. products and technology, which increases interoperability and interdependence between the United States and partners, lowers the unit cost for all, and strengthens the industrial base.

Policy Guidelines for U.S. Security Sector Assistance

To effectively achieve the goals identified above, the United States must strengthen its own capacity to plan, synchronize, and implement security sector assistance through a deliberate and inclusive whole-of-government process that ensures alignment of activities and resources with our national security priorities. Therefore, the United States will:

- Ensure consistency with broader national security goals. Security Sector Assistance programs will support and complement the full range of broad U.S. national security and foreign assistance objectives.

- Foster United States Government policy coherence and interagency collaboration. Transparency and coordination across the United States Government are needed to integrate security sector assistance into broader strategies, synchronize agency efforts, reduce redundancies, minimize assistance-delivery timelines, ensure considerations of the full range of policy and operational equities, improve data collection, measure effectiveness, enhance and sustain the United States Government's security sector assistance knowledge and skills, and identify gaps.

- Build sustainable capacity through comprehensive sector strategies. Partner capacity can only be sustained over the long-term when partner governments have the political will, absorptive capacity, credible and effective institutions, willingness to independently sustain U.S. investments, an equal stake in the success of security sector initiatives, and policy commitment to security
sector reform. United States Government efforts must be sensitive to these requirements, including anticipation of partner capacity, sustainment and oversight needs, coordination with partner governments across the breadth of security sector assistance activities, and pursuit of security sector reform as part of a broader, long term effort to improve governance and promote sustainable economic development.

- Be more selective and use resources for the greatest impact. To maximize the impact of limited resources for security sector assistance, the United States Government will be strategic and focused on investments aligned with national security priorities and in countries where the conditions are right for sustained progress. Resource allocation will be evaluated based on common U.S. Government assessments, multi-year strategies, and performance against measures of effectiveness.

- Be responsive to urgent crises, emergent opportunities, and changes in partner security environments. Though a more strategic, anticipatory approach to security sector assistance should limit this requirement, the United States should have the ability to allocate flexible security sector assistance to respond to short-notice requirements. Timely shifts in partner interests, emerging threats, or performance against security sector objectives may require review of whether security sector investments remain an effective tool in meeting U.S. national security goals. In such instances, U.S. policymakers should consider initiating, restructuring, or terminating security sector assistance programs either as part of the annual planning cycle or on an immediate basis.

- Ensure that short-term interventions are consistent with long term goals. Any instance of surging security sector assistance to meet unforeseen urgent and emergent needs or opportunities should be incorporated into a broader United States Government strategy to sustain any new capacity, mitigate potential negative impacts on other national security objectives, and achieve longer-term U.S. goals and objectives.

- Inform policy with rigorous analysis, assessments, and evaluations. The United States Government will introduce common standards and expectations for assessing security sector assistance requirements, in addition to investing in monitoring and evaluation of security sector assistance programs. Such standards will be aided by a requirement for measurable security sector assistance objectives, appropriate data collection of the impacts and results of security sector assistance programs, and improved efforts to inform decision-making processes with data on what works and what does not work through impact evaluations when permissible. Such standards and data collection will take into account the varying security and information environments where U.S. programs operate.

- Analyze, plan, and act regionally. Security sector assistance programs should be complemented by and linked to a broader regional approach, including cross-border program coordination, support for regional organizations, and facilitation of linkages among partner countries, where appropriate.

- Coordinate with other donors. The United States Government will establish a division of labor with other bilateral, multilateral, and regional actors based on capacity, effectiveness, and comparative advantage. Such coordination will be aimed at sharing the burden across a greater number of interested parties and enhanced coordination with the partner governments to achieve mutually agreed outcomes.
Appendix B: New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States
(Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation)*

THE FACTS

- 1.5 billion people live in conflict-affected and fragile states.
- About 70% of fragile states have seen conflict since 1989.
- Basic governance transformations may take 20-40 years.
- 30% of Official Development Assistance (ODA) is spent in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.
- These countries are furthest away from achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

The current ways of working in fragile states need serious improvement. Despite the significant investment and the commitments of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), results and value for money have been modest. Transitioning out of fragility is long, political work that requires country leadership and ownership. Processes of political dialogue have often failed due to lack of trust, inclusiveness, and leadership. International partners can often bypass national interests and actors, providing aid in overly technocratic ways that underestimate the importance of harmonising with the national and local context, and support short-term results at the expense of medium- to long-term sustainable results brought about by building capacity and systems. A New Deal for engagement in fragile states is necessary.

THE NEW DEAL CONCEPT

“The Dialogue,” endorsed the “New Deal” and committed to undertake the necessary actions and reforms to implement it using the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs), as an important foundation to enable progress towards the MDGs to guide our work in fragile and conflict-affected states. A set of indicators for each goal has been developed by fragile states and international partners to allow tracking of progress at the global and the country level.

Implementation is principle-based, employing the following keywords: FOCUS and TRUST.

FOCUS is with regard to new ways of engaging, to support inclusive country-led and country-owned transitions out of fragility based on a country-led fragility assessment developed by the g7+ with the support of international partners, a country-led one vision and one plan, a country compact to implement the plan, using the PSGs to monitor progress, and support inclusive and participatory political dialogue.

TRUST is built by providing aid and managing resources more effectively and aligning these resources for results. This includes enhancing transparency, managing risk to use country systems, strengthening national capacities and timeliness of aid, and improving the speed and predictability of funding to achieve better results.

The “New Deal,” which builds on the vision and principles articulated from the Millennium Declaration to the Monrovia Roadmap, proposes key peacebuilding and statebuilding goals, focuses on new ways of engaging, and identifies commitments to build mutual trust and achieve better results in fragile states.

Success of the combined effort depends on the leadership and commitment of the g7+ group of fragile states supported by international actors. Constructive state-society relations, and the empowerment of women, youth and marginalized groups, as key actors for peace, are at the heart of successful peacebuilding and statebuilding. They are essential to deliver the “New Deal.”

THE NEW DEAL VISION

The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (“the Dialogue”), comprised of the g7+ group of 19 fragile and conflict-affected countries, development partners, and international organizations, introduced a new development architecture and new ways of working, better tailored to the situation and challenges of fragile contexts, are necessary to build peaceful states and societies. These are presented in the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (the “New Deal”).

The “New Deal,” which builds on the vision and principles articulated from the Millennium
THE NEW DEAL DETAILS

I. Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals - PSGs

The Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) are an important foundation to enable progress towards the MDGs and to guide work in fragile and conflict-affected states. The five goals are:

Legitimate Politics - Foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution
Security - Establish and strengthen people’s security
Justice - Address injustices and increase people’s access to justice
Economic Foundations - Generate employment and improve livelihoods
Revenues & Services - Manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery

The PSGs will guide the identification of peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities at the country level. They will inform the national vision, plan and a country-level compact to implement the plan. They will inform global and country-level funding decisions to help ensure that all fragile countries, and their key peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities, are supported.

A set of indicators for each goal was developed by fragile states and international partners to allow tracking of progress at the global and the country levels. These indicators will combine objective measures with measures to understand the views of people on results achieved. The 2012 United Nations General Assembly and other fora gave full consideration of the PSGs in the post-MDG development framework beyond 2015.

II. FOCUS - Engagement to support country-owned and -led pathways out of fragility

As part of the “New Deal” the FOCUS is on new ways of engaging, to support inclusive country-led and country-owned transitions out of fragility based on a country-led fragility assessment developed by the g7+ with the support of development partners, a country-led one vision and one plan, a country compact to implement the plan, using the PSGs to monitor progress, and support inclusive and participatory political dialogue. An engaged public and civil society, which constructively monitors decision-making, is important to ensure accountability.

F: Fragility assessment. A periodic country-led assessment on the causes and features of fragility and sources of resilience is the basis for one vision, one plan. The assessment includes key national stakeholders and non-state actors and builds upon a harmonized methodology, including a fragility spectrum,[i] developed by the g7+ and supported by international partners.

O: One vision, one plan. One national vision and one plan enable transition out of fragility. This vision and plan will be country-owned and -led, developed in consultation with civil society and based on inputs from the fragility assessment. Plans will be flexible so as to address short-, medium- and long-term peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities. The country-led plan will be the guiding framework for all country-led identification of priorities. They will be monitored, reviewed and adjusted in consultation with key stakeholders on an annual basis.

C: Compact. A compact is a key mechanism to implement one vision, one plan. A compact is drawn from a broad range of views from multiple stakeholders and the public, and reviewed annually through a multi-stakeholder review. Recognizing differences in fragility and national contexts, and that a compact may take different forms at different points in transition out of fragility, a compact ensures harmonization and donor co-ordination, and reduces duplication, fragmentation and programme proliferation.[ii] A compact guides the choice of aid modalities and provides a basis to determine the allocation of donor resources aligned to the country-led national priorities, in line with good aid effectiveness principles. A compact is also a short-term key transitional mechanism to guide country-led priorities while establishing one vision one plan, but always country-led. After the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Korea (29 November – 1 December 2011), the g7+ and international partners developed an agreed definition of a ‘compact’ in fragile states for deeper understanding and socialization, as well as policy guidance on its use and a peer review mechanism between member countries and international partners to support their implementation.

U: Use PSGs to monitor. We will use the PSGs targets and indicators to monitor country-level progress.
S: Support political dialogue and leadership. Increased support for credible and inclusive processes of political dialogue is through support for global, regional, and national initiatives to build the capacity of government and civil society leaders and institutions to lead peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts. Specific support is targeted to promote youth and women’s participation in political dialogue and leadership initiatives.

III. TRUST - Commitments for results

The “New Deal” builds mutual TRUST by providing aid and managing resources more effectively and aligning these resources for results. Recent evidence reveals that implementation of the previous commitments has been uneven and we re-affirm the commitments made in the Paris Declaration, Accra Agenda for Action and the Fragile States Principles (2007). [iii] In doing so, it enhances transparency, risk management to use country systems, strengthens national capacities and timeliness of aid, and improves the speed and predictability of funding to achieve better results. An essential pre-condition for progress in all of the New Deal’s commitments is to foster confidence between people, communities, the state and international partners. This involves delivering visible results quickly and on a continuous basis.

T: Transparency. This includes more transparent use of aid (ODA and non-ODA), monitoring, through the DAC, overall resource flows to fragile states, and tracking international assistance against individual goals. Locally, countries with international support, will strengthen, or where necessary, support the creation and development of national reporting and planning systems (e.g. budgets, transparency portals, aid information management systems) and provide support to domestic oversight mechanisms including national parliaments. This achieves greater transparency of fiscal systems in a manner consistent to capacity and context, drawing from good practice from the g7+ and agreed international benchmarks on transparency of aid resources in a manner consistent with International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) compatible standards. [iv] Solicitation of citizen’s views to assess the transparency of domestic resources and aid also builds on the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action. [v]

R: Risk-sharing. Risk is accepted in engaging during transition, recognizing that the risk of non-engagement in this context can outweigh most risks of engagement. Identifying context-specific, joint donor risk-mitigation strategies will require different approaches to risk management and capacity development. Conducting joint assessments of the specific risks associated with working in fragile situations and identifying and using joint mechanisms will reduce and better manage risks so as to build the capacity of and enhance the use of, country systems, step up investments for peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities, and reduce aid volatility.

U: Use and strengthen country systems. Oversight and accountability measures are required to enhance confidence in and enable the expanded use and strengthening of country systems. [vi] Recipient governments, with support from international partners, will take all reasonable measures to strengthen their public financial management systems from the ground up and be transparent in this process. In doing so, this builds related fiduciary and administrative capacity within country institutions at the national and local level. International partners will increase the percentage of aid delivered through country systems [vii] on the basis of measures and targets jointly agreed at the country level. [viii] Recipient governments will seek to increase the proportion of public expenditure funded by domestic revenues.

S: Strengthen capacities. To ensure efficient support to build critical capacities of institutions of the state and civil society in a balanced manner, the proportion of funds for capacity development through jointly administered and funded pooled facilities will increase. [ix] Program implementation units per institution [x] will reduce substantially and targeting the use of external technical assistance, ensuring they report through to the relevant national authority, will increase. Remuneration codes of conduct between government and international partners for national experts will be jointly reached, and the exchange of South-South and fragile-fragile experiences on transitions out of fragility facilitated.

T: Timely and predictable aid. Simplified, accountable fast-track financial management and procurement procedures will be developed and used to improve the speed and flexibility of aid delivery in fragile situations,[xi] along with review of national legal frameworks to support shared objectives. This is to increase the predictability of aid, including publication of three-to-five year indicative forward estimates (as committed in the
Accra Agenda for Action), and more effective use of global and country level funds for peacebuilding and statebuilding. [xii] Where national legislation may prevent this, development partners will seek to address these aid delivery challenges to allow them to better deliver on these commitments. Necessary data for the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) [xiii] will enable regular reporting on volatility.

THE NEW DEAL: From Paris to Busan

The "New Deal" is based on the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (2007), the Kinshasa Statement (2008), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), the Dili Declaration and consecutive g7+ Statements (2010-2011), the Monrovia Roadmap (2011), and the work undertaken by “the Dialogue” working groups.[xiv] It also acknowledges that the Principles and Good Practices of Humanitarian Donorship will be followed with respect to humanitarian action. The Cairo Conference on Capacity Development (February 2011), the Addis Ababa Meeting on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (September 2011), and the g7+ Juba Ministerial Retreat (October 2011) have contributed to shaping and building consensus around the New Deal. Recognizing that building peaceful states requires long-term efforts and incremental approaches, “New Deal” implementation between 2012-2015 is seen as a trial period.

“THE DIALOGUE” CONTINUES

Going forward, “the Dialogue” has a vital role to play in supporting members in implementing the “New Deal” and in continuing to promote effective ways to support countries transitioning out of fragility and building peaceful states. The g7+ group will continue as the country-owned and country-led global mechanism to monitor report and draw attention to the unique challenges faced by fragile states. International partners will continue to support this mechanism. “The Dialogue” meets annually to provide a platform for its members and reach out to other interested partners, discuss progress in reforming efforts to support peacebuilding and statebuilding, and agree on additional joint actions as required.

“The Dialogue” is working to implement this New Deal including via:

- Piloting: This includes the piloting of the “New Deal” (PSGs, FOCUS and TRUST) in self-nominating countries, including Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Timor-Leste and self-nominating donor partners in these countries.
- Reporting: This includes reports on the delivery of the “New Deal” commitments focused at the country level and at the global level will.

Endnotes:

[i] The Fragility Spectrum is a diagnostic tool to assist fragile and conflict affected states to identify the nature of their own fragility and plan a pathway of transition towards stability and development.
[ii] See Fragile States Principle 7: “Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts. Where governments demonstrate political will to foster development, but lack capacity, international actors should seek to align assistance behind government strategies. Where capacity is limited, the use of alternative aid instruments - such as international compacts or multi-donor trust funds - can facilitate shared priorities and responsibility for execution between national and international institutions”.
[iv] Transparency can also be pursued through other international standards.
[v] See Accra Agenda for Action paragraph 24a.
[vi] These will include contracting out fiduciary service, using independent monitoring agents, co-managing programme implementation, a donor-led review of acquisition and assistance and any other relevant policies to ensure these objectives are met.
[vii] Building on Accra Agenda for Action paragraph 15.
[viii] As permitted by donors’ respective applicable legal provisions.
[ix] Consistent with donor applicable legal provisions and building on Paris Declaration target 4 that “50% of technical cooperation flows [be] implemented through co-ordinated programmes consistent with national development strategies”.
[x] Building on Paris Declaration target 6 which aims to “reduce by two-thirds the stock of parallel project implementation units (PIUs)” in-country, and Fragile States Principle 2: Do no harm.
[xi] Where possible, in accordance with national legislation and the Accra Agenda for Action paragraph 26c.
[xii] The DAC is a committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The OECD also hosts the Secretariat of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.
[xiii] Four “Dialogue” working groups met and discussed key blockages to effective support to peacebuilding and statebuilding, and recommendations to address them in the following areas: i) political dialogue; ii) planning processes; iii) capacity development; iv) aid instruments.

*Derived from G7+ New Deal Document; internet: http://www.g7plus.org/new-deal-document
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