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LETTER FROM THE EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Dear Reader,

As we finalize this issue of *Building Peace*, it feels as though the world is in greater need than ever of approaches to heal stark political divides, remedy glaring social and economic inequalities, and solve critical health and environmental challenges. As I write, international headlines express increasing urgency about the deaths in Gaza and Israel, the governance challenges exacerbating the Ebola crisis in West Africa, and the extreme violence across Central America forcing caretakers to send children unaccompanied and undocumented to the United States. This issue doesn’t have all the answers to the current violence raging around the globe, but it highlights the trends that will drive the conflicts of tomorrow and sets out creative peacebuilding and human security responses to those threats.

The *Building Peace* team conferred with experts from around the world to identify the types of conflicts that will become increasingly prevalent in the coming decade. Among these key leaders was Sundeep Waslekar, founder of Strategic Foresight Group. In his thought-provoking article, Waslekar provides a framework called 4-G, which categorizes the future of peace and conflict through the lenses of growth, governance, God, and geopolitics. Expanding on the insights of Waslekar and our other international authors, this issue of *Building Peace* calls out three specific conflict trends that demand our attention:

- Illicit economic activity
- Competition over natural resources
- Lack of state legitimacy

The articles in this issue provide a guide to understanding, probing, and predicting world events. It is natural to feel despair when following the news today as headlines continue to highlight escalating conflicts and crises across the globe. But what if we can turn despair into knowledge, action, and prevention? Our authors share key information and analysis that can help us navigate the future of peace and conflict. They tell stories that weave the conflicts of today and yesterday into visions of conflicts of the future, but they also point toward hope. Indeed, in the act of identifying conflict trends and documenting local prevention efforts, our authors trace the outlines of a path to a more peaceful future. In this issue, we highlight the promise of technology (Puig), consider what a peacebuilding lens can contribute to crime prevention (Banfield), and are encouraged by a security expert to consider peace as a “transcendental destination” (Arquilla).

As D’Esposito and Martin suggest, global citizens like you are increasingly aware of their role in international dynamics: “Whether we produce or buy a wedding ring or a cell phone, society wants to know that no harm was done and that our purchases contribute to peace and development.” We know you will appreciate the exploration in their article and the accompanying one by Loch of Motorola Solutions in which our authors envision a peacebuilding model that involves government, private sector, and local actors “taking the conflict out of conflict minerals.”

While competition over natural resources deserves an entire issue of *Building Peace*, our focus here is specifically on water and minerals as a means of providing a look at one sub-sector, its challenges, and perhaps some solutions. The conversation around technology is also sweeping in scope, which is why we are devoting our March 2015 issue to the topic. Inside these pages is an illustration of the promise of peacebuilding technology—Wise and Mukhtar describe the way basic but powerful cell phone technology is preventing violence in rural South Sudan.

The purpose of issue four of *Building Peace* is to equip you, our readers, with knowledge, analysis, and first-hand perspectives that we can convert into action today. The conflict trends of tomorrow that our authors address are relevant now, but will become even more significant with time. Consider the articles in this issue of *Building Peace* an agenda that all of us can pursue. In the midst of conflict, inequity, and failed states, there are solutions, small and big, but they depend on our knowledge and commitment combined with human, financial, and technological resources. We welcome your feedback and comments on these exciting ideas and look forward to engaging with you.

Warmly,

Jessica Berns
Editor-in-Chief
In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech in 1987, Oscar Arias Sánchez, president of Costa Rica, remarked, “Peace has no finishing line, no final destination. It is like climbing a mountain peak only to realize that there is another one in front of you.”

Sánchez’s words illustrate the journey of peacemaking. The future of peace is not about the outcome of violent conflicts. It is not about extrapolating trends from the past to the present and the present to the future. It is not about a final destination.

The 4-G framework—growth, governance, God, and geopolitics—is useful in considering the future of countries affected by conflict. Developed by Strategic Foresight Group (SFG), an international think tank that has worked with governments and national institutions of more than fifty countries from four continents, the framework’s four factors can be narrowed into ten drivers of either peace or continued conflict:

- growth of income and employment,
- inequity from imbalanced growth,
- climate change,
- water competition and cooperation,
- access to the national governance apparatus for the entire population,
- competitive extremism using religion and sectarianism as instruments,
- expansion of peacebuilding capacities,
- geopolitical competition,
- the downside of technological revolutions, and
- efficacy of global governance architecture.

It is commonly believed that poverty produces conflicts and mediation makes peace, but instead it is the interplay of the
four factors within the 4-G framework and its ten drivers that shape the trajectory of social and political dynamics. Sometimes, this trajectory is the continuation of a current trend, but more often it is the emergence of an unforeseen discontinuity.

One seed of conflict is a sense of economic and social deprivation. This deprivation can often be traced to historical factors but, just as often, it is helpful to take the contemporary period into consideration. “Delete the Elite” graffiti seen recently in Ljubljana, Slovenia, is much like the spray-painted expressions on the walls of Athens, Delhi, Phnom Penh, Johannesburg, Cairo, Paris, Milan, Detroit, Rio, and Davos, indicating that this sense of marginalization is increasingly widespread.

If those who feel deprived are motivated to publicly express discontent, they are also apt to organize demonstrations and vote in elections. If not, they may resort to violence. History has illustrated that if activists are jailed and insulted, they discover primordial or ideological loyalties to organize themselves against their captors and the power they represent. A conflict is born. And if neighboring countries, foreign powers, or other outside players take sides, the conflict is magnified.

In 2014, this pattern fits circumstances in Syria, Ukraine, the Central African Republic, DR Congo, Egypt, Sudan, South Sudan, Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, Naxalite districts in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, and the Philippines.

By 2040, much of the world may well face the risk of violent conflict capable of destabilizing societies. Certainly, as neoliberal economic policies and expensive elections help domineering groups tighten their grip on society, the call to “delete the elite” is likely to deepen. If so, outcomes will come to depend on how democracy is practiced.

By 2040, authoritarian regimes in North Korea, Sudan, Turkmenistan, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe may well have come to an end. In fact, if democracy is narrowly defined as a system of elections to decide on a ruler, then most countries will likely have embraced democracy. The debate about democracy versus dictatorship would then logically be over, and the debate about the meaning and delivery of democracy underway. The question of the meaning of democracy will always be vital. Even today, there are countries where governments are elected and, in that sense they could claim to be democracies, but the practice of governance by these leaders is not accountable to its people.

Several Egyptian leaders, the Castros of Cuba, and the Assads of Syria have all been technically elected, only to impose authoritarian regimes. Moreover, in many other countries, particularly in Asia, elected regimes have not become authoritarian, yet have complete monopoly of power with hardly any space for opposition. Cambodia is the most glaring example, but it is not the only one. Therefore, the meaning of democracy as a system that is genuinely accountable to its people will become increasingly tested as leaders use elections rather than armed coups as tools to seize power.

When democracy delivers justice and accountability, creating a space where people can express their views in a non-violent way, peace has a good chance of persevering. When democracy merely provides legitimacy for dominant interests, nations experience conflict. Because China, Russia, and the United States will likely still have influence and interests outside their national borders in the future, they will face the same test. If the countries accept the result of democratic competition in those territories, regardless of the religion and ideology of the winners, they will have peace. If, however, they use military intervention or supply arsenals to chosen parties, they will likely face violent conflict.

In the religious sphere, we are entering an era of competitive extremism, from the Lord’s Resistance Army to al-Qaeda and beyond. Extreme versions of virtually all religions—Pentecostal Christianity, Shi’a as well as Sunni Islam, Judaism, even Buddhism and Hinduism—are on the rise. Just as the Crusades of the twelfth century were about competition for power in the name of God, so are those of the twenty-first.

I met Hussain bin Alawi, the Foreign Minister of Oman, soon after Samuel Huntington published his book Clash of...
In the religious sphere, we are entering an era of competitive extremism, from the Lord’s Resistance Army to al-Qaeda and beyond.

Civilizations in 1993. “The term clash of civilizations is a misnomer,” Alawi declared. He asserted that “the civilized do not clash by definition. They make peace.” This notion is relevant now as many societies across the world work to strengthen democracy and governance toward a peaceful future.

Over the next twenty-five years, the United States, China, and Russia are more than likely to remain major powers. Other countries—such as Brazil, Iran, and Turkey—may join them from the sidelines. It is in the nature of states to aggrandize their interests. Economic interdependence does not prevent rivalry from turning deadly, however, as World War I and World War II have proven. When major powers compete in global space, they will look for sides to take and find willing partners in unpredictable places. Who could have imagined, for example, what is now unfolding in Ukraine today, a place whose geography and geopolitics placed it at the epicenter of international conflict?

In the twentieth century, the Cold War was the primary determinant of violent conflict across the globe. In the twenty-first century, imbalances in economic growth, domestic governance, and international power structures are the primary factors.

Certain new developments will also be in play. One of these is the declining availability of fresh water. Given climate change, the retreat of glaciers, excessive evaporation, increased pollution, population growth, expanding economies, and ever-larger cities, the gap between demand and supply of usable water will only continue to grow. Unless new mechanisms for hydro-diplomacy are established, neighboring countries seem likely to clash. Even in the next decade, for example, Egypt and Ethiopia could conceivably go to war over dams in Ethiopia and historical claims to water in Egypt. The same is true of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, for the same reasons. A great arch of hydro insecurity from Thailand to Turkey and Egypt to Uganda looms large on the horizon. (See Figure 1: Mega Arc of Hydro-Insecurity on pg. 27)

Another development involves new technologies. Great powers may slide from proxy fights between their partners to a direct military confrontation with advanced technology and the orbit immediately around the earth in outer space will more than likely be the main theater of war. At the same time, genomics and nanotechnology revolutions could easily be misused to develop the next generation of weapons. Some may be used by states and some in asymmetrical warfare by non-state entities.

Will new and old challenges together pose problems too difficult to surmount? Or is it possible to build enduring peace?

Europe, which fought wars for more than two thousand years, illustrates the possibility of peace. It has developed regional institutions of peace and cooperation. Other countries, in North America, Latin America, Western Africa, and Southeast Asia, are following in its footsteps. If this trend continues, wars between neighbors might be averted. Cooperation in shared water will be critical; countries that engage in active water cooperation do not go to war.

At the global level, the critical missing piece is a cohesive architecture of governance. Only specialized agencies for the economy, energy, trade, health, migration, and various other issues are in place. Despite a veneer to the end, the UN Security Council is instead the embodiment of an international class system. The upper class has permanent seats with veto power. The lower class waits its turn and when it gets one, it is with unequal rights. Even as patterns of violence are synchronized through condensation of fault lines in growth, governance, God, and geopolitics, global governance is fragmented. If current trends continue, these fault lines will deepen. A new approach to the architecture of global governance is still possible, however.

One positive development is the move from G8 to G20 groups, which reflects a more inclusive and representative range of countries. The debate on UN Security Council reforms has begun. The progress is inadequate but the direction is right. The peace-building community around the world needs to build consensus and work towards a more inclusive and just global order.

Today, think tanks, civil society groups, universities, and legislatures can conceptualize new ideas, exchange them across the world, form networks, and influence state thinking.
to envision a cohesive and functional mechanism that enables world leaders to address emerging violent conflicts and negotiate collaborative solutions to prevent them.

This new architecture of global governance needs to emphasize sustainable solutions based on compromise. If such architecture had existed, the current conflict in Ukraine would likely not have taken place, and the United States and Russia not have needed to agree on a Finland-type neutral status for a united Ukraine. It is now too late to undo the damage in Ukraine. But robust global architecture to define solutions of compromise can prevent such conflicts in the future. The architecture for building peace in an increasingly complex world will need to blend the conventional art of peace and diplomacy with specialized expertise in water, space, and other domains.

Developing ideas for such global architecture from the bottom up is possible. After the Second World War, heads of nations conceived the United Nations and World Bank systems. States monopolized knowledge. Today, think tanks, civil society groups, universities, and legislatures can conceptualize new ideas, exchange them across the world, form networks, and influence state thinking. They can come together on the basis of shared values, rather than conflicting national interests, to make another world possible.

The new peacebuilding endeavor cannot be confined to reshaping the global order, however. It must begin at home. In the end, the most critical building blocks of the future will be our societies and nations. Innovation in social engineering, governance, technology, and economic restructuring must be guided to disrupt monopoly of power within our societies, create an inclusive world, and promote dialogue at all levels. If we take this path, we can create a peaceful civilization and continually renew it since, as Oscar Arias expressed in Oslo in 1987, peace has no finishing line.

Sundeep Waslekar is President of Strategic Foresight Group. He has negotiated with armed militants and heads of governments, crafted new policy concepts, and authored a best-selling book on governance in his native language, Marathi.
Think global, act local is a bumper sticker the peacebuilding field would do well to take to heart. By supporting locally-led approaches to peacebuilding in specific conflict situations and as an overarching goal globally, we can create more effective and sustainable processes for positive change while ensuring our field remains true to its core principles.

Since 1998, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been caught up in a cycle of conflict that has enriched armed militias and impacted neighboring countries. In the process, DRC communities have suffered a range of abuses and found themselves with largely ineffective local justice mechanisms. In the South Kivu province, however, some communities are taking a different approach to addressing the difficult issues of accountability, justice, and peacemaking. Since 2010, a local Congolese organization, Fondation Chirezi (FOCHI), has taken an innovative approach to help fill this void.

FOCHI’s primary focus is to ensure swift, accessible, and free justice to rural village populations. Staff and volunteers work with local communities and within traditional structures to establish community peace courts called barazas. Baraza is a Swahili word meaning gathering and suggests an open approach based on restorative rather than punitive processes of justice and truth-seeking. Barazas are created in rural villages with little access to other justice mechanisms and provide a space for resolving conflicts through dialogue, mediation, and reconciliation. A FOCHI innovation, they integrate traditional processes and local knowledge into their approach.

The use of peace courts in peacebuilding is not a recent innovation, but FOCHI has
developed a unique process for integrating women into the justice process. First establishing a mixed-gender peace court supported by male community leaders, FOCHI then created an all-female peace court to encourage women to come forward with cases of sexual and domestic violence. Cases are brought to the court and resolved by the baraza leaders, and the special women’s courts provide confidential services for crimes such as marital rape. In these cases, women often prefer non-traditional forms of justice: rather than send her husband to jail, leaving her defenseless and without income, a woman may opt for him to live with a neighbor, returning daily for housework and childcare.

The community also organizes reconciliation ceremonies to eliminate lingering roots of hatred, achieving resolution communally. As the barazas are increasingly integrated within South Kivu communities, they have become a focus for livelihood development, including microfinance, as well.

In reducing violence and increasing collaboration, trust, and empowerment within communities and also between villagers—ex-rebel fighters, local leaders, and authorities—becomes paramount, and the barazas have had a positive impact where many other donor-driven projects have failed. Those involved with the program cited access to justice and empowerment of women as the most significant changes. To date, 90 percent of the 1,500 cases brought to the barazas have been resolved, a number that holds up admirably against the results of formal justice systems often favored by donor funds (see the program evaluation here).)

Recent research and policy discussions in the United States and at the United Nations are raising attention to the problems created by externally-driven peacebuilding efforts that lack adequate local knowledge, undermine or drain local leadership, and fail to advance sustainable change beyond immediate crises. The development field has become so dependent on external funding and donor-driven approaches that even the best intentioned efforts to support locally-led approaches are caught in a system already designed to operate from the outside, in.

As the baraza courts in South Kivu demonstrate, however, when local peacebuilders are empowered to lead in designing and implementing programs, they reduce violence and advance positive change in powerful and lasting ways. And these results are achieved at very little cost: for example, $27 to resolve a case through the baraza initiative versus around $1,000 in the courts.

Locally-led peacebuilding is not simple. The challenges of scaling up community-level efforts are significant, and we are only beginning to find ways to support and evaluate such impacts. Reshaping relationships between international actors and local peacebuilders will also require careful listening and new modes of cooperation, committed time, and dedicated resources. But it is possible. Our partnership between the Chirezi Foundation and Peace Direct USA is one example.

Our shared vision of a more peaceful and just world demands we ensure that local peacebuilders are at the center rather than the margins of designing and creating positive futures for their communities. This will require determined effort, concrete policies, and practical solutions from our field and it may also require a fundamental flip in the direction the peacebuilding world is now headed.

Floribert Kazingufu founded the Chirezi Foundation to “build peace and change lives” in South Kivu.

Bridget Moix serves on the board of Peace Direct USA and is a research fellow at George Mason’s School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (S-CAR).

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Baraza is a Swahili word meaning gathering . . . . [they] are created in rural villages with little access to other justice mechanisms and provide a space for resolving conflicts through dialogue, mediation, and reconciliation.
The peacebuilding practitioner, John Paul Lederach, neatly summarizes in “The Moral Imagination” how we can use technology to increase the impact of peacebuilding initiatives:

Reach out to those you fear. Touch the heart of complexity. Imagine beyond what is seen. Risk vulnerability one step at a time.

These four approaches are mirrored in four contemporary digital tools: social media, communication technologies, digital games, and online dialogue. Most local peacebuilders operate in tough operational environments with limited resources. New technologies offer possibilities for local peacebuilders to increase their reach and impact, overcoming both resource and operational barriers.

Social Media

Too often, communities in conflict know very little about each other. There is fear in the unknown and peacebuilders work hard to share stories across conflict divides. Yet persuading people to reach across to those they fear can be difficult. Can local peacebuilders use social media as a first step to bridge this divide?

The Peace Factory is a nonprofit organization promoting peace in the Middle East by making connections between people on Facebook. The Peace Factory initially encouraged people to post a simple message of love from Israelis to Iranians. The campaign quickly expanded to other conflicted pairs (Palestine-Israel, Morocco-Iran, Pakistan-Israel, America-Iran, and so on). The group has since led a number of online and offline initiatives, including posting banners of love between Israelis and Iranians on buses in Tel Aviv and running a matching system called “Friend me for Peace” that encourages Facebook “friending” across conflict divides. Although its initiatives have not yet been formally evaluated, the organization points to the potential of personal sharing over social media as a low-resource complement to engaging in deeper, face-to-face discussions about identity.

Communication Technologies

Sometimes information surrounding a conflict is well off the mark and inaccurate—in reports of violence or relating what citizens are worried about. Very often, information is either out of date or feeds a
common narrative disseminated by more vocal parts of society (or both). Hardly ever is information based on evidence, much less recent evidence. How could it be? Depending on the context, it can be dangerous to ask about certain sensitive topics or logistically complicated to gather information. Yet without adequate information, understanding the complex drivers of a conflict and finding the best levers for intervention is difficult.

In the Somali region of Africa, Interpeace is working with three local research institutions to run regular, fast, and relatively low-cost participatory polling processes that will provide up-to-date and reliable information on people’s views about the democratization process. Combined with the rich contextual understanding and ongoing qualitative research of these institutions, polling data offers additional, strategic support to long-term change processes. What makes them operationally viable is a combination of text messaging (SMS) and online tools: Magpi for data collection on tablets, FrontlineSMS for data collection via SMS, First Mile GEO for data processing and analysis, and Elva for crowdsourcing. (For a full description of the system, click here.)

**Digital Games**

One of the hardest things for communities living in conflict is to imagine a common future. Community workshops, peace festivals, and conferences are important forums for encouraging this vision, but often hard to scale. Could digital games be a viable alternative for connection?

A group of Arab and Jewish Israeli teenagers recently built a peace village together—in the virtual realm of the Minecraft game world. It was an initiative of Games for Peace, a nonprofit organization that believes “online games represent a radical new way of bridging the gap between young people in conflict zones.” The initiative has not yet been evaluated, but the pilot was popular enough that a broader game is being planned.

**New technologies empower local peacebuilders to do what was previously impossible and can be effective tools of the moral imagination, shifting future trends in peacebuilding toward more local, impactful, and imaginative implementation.**

Games for Peace demonstrates the potential for existing popular games to enable collaborative game-play situations where a peaceful future can be imagined.

**Online Dialogue**

One of the toughest challenges local peacebuilders face is facilitating positive contact to create the conditions for a brokered peace. But often physical contact between groups on either side of a divide is difficult for political, security, and purely logistical reasons. Can local peacebuilders engineer meaningful contact over online platforms?

Soliya’s Connect Program is an online, cross-cultural education program that links undergraduate programs in a hundred universities and has brought together students from twenty-seven countries since 2003. Students join a group of about ten students and two facilitators and meet online for two hours over ten weeks. They talk about everyday life and culture as well as controversial social and political issues. Facilitators are trained to manage tensions, introduce activities, and maintain an atmosphere for constructive dialogue. The program regularly receives rave reviews about its effectiveness in providing avenues for students to risk sharing their differences and rejoice in their similarities.

**Technology and the Moral Imagination**

These initiatives illustrate how technology can provide tools for local peacebuilders to encourage people to see that building peace is possible. Conflict situations, Lederach tells us, are often constrained by the sense of inevitability often present in conflict. What peacebuilders need to do is provide spaces for the moral imagination to emerge. Moral imagination is the ability to recognize turning points and possibilities in order to venture down unknown paths and create what does not exist. New technologies empower local peacebuilders to do what was previously impossible and can be effective tools of the moral imagination, shifting future trends in peacebuilding toward more local, impactful, and imaginative implementation.

Helena Puig Larrauri is a peacebuilding practitioner focusing on the use of technology to promote peace and prevent conflict. She is a co-organizer of Build Peace and co-founder of Build Up, and she is on the Board of Advisors of the Standby Task Force, which she co-founded in 2010.
When we went through the . . . containment site after the revolution, we were demobilized . . . for five days. How can a man who went through a revolution for fourteen consecutive years [be healed in] only five days? Just [put yourself in his shoes]. You think they’ll not be traumatized? In five days’ time you say “go,” you give him US$150. Then after . . . the $150 is finished, what [can he do]? So it’s good that the motorcycle business came to Liberia. If it were not so, I swear you [could not] come to this country. People will be blasting things [being violent]. You getting me? Even myself as a former [military officer], I will form my men and we will be at the corner and we will highjack the car because I’m not doing anything. But I don’t have to do that. Motorcycles came to Liberia and now I can [tell people about] this opportunity.

—FORMER COMBATANT

Since the end of Liberia’s protracted civil war in 2003, motorcycle taxi driving—called pen-pen driving, locally—has helped build peace in the country by providing people with both a livelihood and a means of transport while helping drivers reintegrate into society. Yet pen-pen driving is a profession fraught with challenges, and one that requires the attention of the peacebuilding community.

Many pen-pen drivers were combatants during the fourteen-year conflict (1989–2003) that devastated Liberia’s infrastructure. Motorcycles became an alternative means of transport in part because they are faster than cars and buses and are easier to access. Although pen-pen drivers have become valued service providers, they are also often perceived as outcasts. Pen-pen drivers have been known to engage in lawless behavior and to confront both police and customers. Their low
We were listening to messages of hope and commitment to help improve local communities through collaboration.

These factors motivated us to work with pen-pen drivers and those who regularly interact with them to help minimize the likelihood of political violence. We created an opportunity for community members to come together including police, drivers, and customers, to talk with each other and develop ideas for peacebuilding. In these sessions, we were listening to much more than peacebuilding strategies—we were listening to messages of hope and commitment to help improve local communities through collaboration.

The group formed a local peace committee called the Pen-Pen Peace Network. Over the last ten months, the committee has developed a multimedia campaign based on text messages, radio, and billboards to improve attitudes toward and behaviors of pen-pen drivers. It has also designed and conducted an outreach plan to various audiences. Working with the Purdue Peace Project and the Women Movement for Sustainable Development, the committee has helped design surveys to measure the impact of these strategies. It has advocated on behalf of pen-pen drivers and some members have become part of Liberia’s national-level conversation about the industry. They have all, in effect, become local leaders.

Challenges still exist. The Pen-Pen Peace Network, however, drives home the message that local, everyday citizens can be effective peacebuilders. It inspires us to believe that, together, the imagining and doing of peacebuilding is possible. Our hope is that the committee’s efforts will help pen-pen drivers reintegrate into society and contribute to the economy, undo their image as perpetrators of violence, and promote their role as agents of peace.

Update: At the time this issue of Building Peace was being finalized, the Pen-Pen Peace Network initiated a public awareness campaign throughout Monrovia to educate citizens about Ebola virus prevention and created hand-washing stations around the city. The Pen-Pen Peace Network was inspired to tackle their country’s recent challenges and, with efficient transportation, the Pen-Pen drivers are well positioned to aid their community. This extension of the program’s activities maintains its focus on locally-centered initiatives.

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Grace Yeanay Mayson is Executive Director of Women Movement for Sustainable Development in Liberia. She is also a Board Member of ABANTU for Development in Ghana and a Country Consultant for the Aids Healthcare Foundation (AHF).

Kai Kuang is a doctoral candidate of communication at the Brian Lamb School of Communication at Purdue University.
In the locality of Kebkabiya, North Darfur, some 150 kilometers west of Sudan’s capital city of El Fasher, the Sudanese Development Initiative (SUDIA) is using low-tech solutions to build peace by improving communication flows to improve livelihoods.

“The most important problems we face here are a lack of security and problems between the Beni Hussein and Rizeigat tribes,” says Yasin Hussein Abbakr. Yasin, formerly a farmer in the small village of Gurra Farjawiya, was displaced to the town of Kebkabiya and is now a proud member of SUDIA’s Community Communications System (CCS). Through CCS, Yasin and other community members from ten Kebkabiya settlements have received training to help them become better ambassadors for peace. Impressively, Yasin and his new colleagues decided to immediately implement those skills in a purely community-led project born of a strong desire to end old tribal rivalries. Already, some stolen livestock has been recovered and some intertribal negotiations have been launched. The negotiations, Yasin says, are the most important achievement.

In Kebkabiya, engagement and communication are particularly salient concerns. Traditionally sustained by agriculture and livestock trade, Kebkabiya hit the spotlight in 2012 when gold was discovered in nearby Jebel Amer. The discovery brought an influx of outsiders and, with them, an upswing in violence as already scarce resources were stretched to the breaking point. But even before the discovery of gold, competition over land had increased in the wake of desertification and a history of heavy conflict in the region, both factors which have made peaceful co-existence challenging to maintain. Given proliferation of arms, disputes over land and resources have become increasingly
violent. In addition, conventional communication channels are limited and unreliable. Locals depend on community leaders, mobile phones, and radio to receive what information they can, but the flow is erratic.

Good communication improves not only relationships within and among communities, but also has a positive impact on livelihoods. For example, by providing information about shortages, market prices, harvest progress, disputes, and peace activity, community members are able to make more informed day-to-day decisions. The CCS uses text messaging to communicate with sources—selected from both genders and all ages and local tribes—in the ten-village cluster. Sources are requested to send at least two messages weekly on issues pertinent to community life. In return, they receive a weekly and monthly summary of all CCS messages which they are encouraged to share and discuss.

Thirty-four-year-old Saliha Younis Mohammed from the village of Edded Al-Nas used to get most of her news from her younger brothers or by chatting with the neighbors. If the network was good, she would call friends in other villages, but coverage is patchy, so she was often unaware of what was happening outside her village. The presence of armed militias on the roads means that traveling between villages is dangerous, making it difficult to spread vital security information any other way.

Saliha is responsible for her younger siblings. “Being a part of the CCS means I am better informed and can make better decisions for my family,” Saliha explains. “When I learn from the CCS that the well in a nearby village is damaged, I know not to send my sisters to collect water there.”

Saifeddin Mohammed Abbakar was displaced from his farm and lost his income. He uses CSS information to inform his friends of market prices in various areas so they can choose the best place to sell their goods and help more food reach areas affected by shortages. Being part of the CCS gives Saifeddin the opportunity to have a valuable impact on his community, contributing to others even as he rebuilds his own life.

For SUDIA, this enthusiasm is an important reminder that building peace is not a top-down process. There can be no peace without community engagement.

“Being a part of the CCS means I am better informed and can make better decisions for my family,” Saliha explains. “When I learn from the CCS that the well in a nearby village is damaged, I know not to send my sisters to collect water there.”

Krista Wise is studying intercultural mediation with a special focus on identity, migration, and conflict prevention at Charles de Gaulle University, Lille.

Adam Mukhtar has more than fourteen years experience in humanitarian operations in Sudan and South Sudan, including five years with the UN peacekeeping mission in Sudan before separation.
Last year, authorities seized 1,300 kilograms of cocaine in Paris from an Air France flight originating from Caracas. In 2009, drug smugglers unloaded 10,000 kilograms of cocaine in Gao, Mali for transport to the European market from a Boeing 747 that took off from Venezuela. Both of these incidents reflect the nature of modern transnational organized crime in several respects. One of these is the magnitude of illicit material. The Paris flight alone carried an estimated street value of 200 million euros, or roughly ten percent of the GDP of Liberia, worth of cocaine. The brazen nature of both events also makes it clear that official complicity in origin countries is highly likely, given the difficulty of loading such quantities of drugs onto a plane without raising suspicion. Additionally, the origin and destination of the flights capture the dynamic of global demand and supply that propels much of today’s organized crime.

What these episodes do not tell us is that organized crime has a major influence on violence and conflict worldwide. Homicide rates in Latin America, the epicenter of the drugs trade, can exceed the casualty figures of civil wars. Meanwhile, the fortunes generated by organized crime fuel corruption, terrorism, and exploitation. Yet those actually producing the illicit goods profit the least and often continue to face dire poverty and poor governance. In the case of drugs, military-style eradication programs often exacerbate the situation. Whether organized crime is on the increase is difficult to assess, but that it is substantial in scope and here to stay is unquestionable.

Organized crime can only be understood within the context of economic globalization and current levels of inequality. These circumstances are, in part, what transformed cross-border smuggling and local protection rackets into transnational drug networks and a global trade in counterfeit goods and human beings.

Over the last few decades, globalization has significantly increased the scope and volume of transnational connectivity and commerce. It has also connected supply and demand for illicit resources, products, and services between richer and poorer parts of the world, and not by chance. Western banks such as Standard Chartered and HSBC, financial intermediaries, and poor compliance with
Organized crime can only be understood within the context of economic globalization and current levels of inequality. These circumstances are, in part, what transformed cross-border smuggling and local protection rackets into transnational drug networks and a global trade in counterfeit goods and human beings.

To address the problem, a global focus on the supply, transit, and demand of trade is warranted. Current practice, though, largely reflects the preferences of richer, more developed countries. One of the more extreme examples of this propensity is how the international drugs prohibition regime emphasizes reducing supply through a zero-tolerance law enforcement approach, ignoring the conditions that help generate supply and facilitate transit. The consequences include a tightening of supply which, given stable demand, pushes up both prices and violence in production and transit countries.

Additionally, any approach must take social and political contexts into account. The global increase of inequality, as highlighted by the recent work of Oxfam and Thomas Piketty, perpetuates a situation in which hundreds of millions of people continue to live in abject poverty and social divides in many countries have intensified and become structural. The ramifications are twofold. First, a ready army of producers, brokers, couriers, and forgers can be recruited for criminal purposes, which allows shifting the main risks onto those who gain the least from organized crime. The miserable story of those who navigate narco-sub across the Caribbean illustrates this well. Second, absent better prospects and in the face of low levels of social capital between groups in some environments, crime has become a legitimate, even respected, activity.

In short, the challenge is not how to eliminate transnational organized crime but rather how to minimize its most harmful consequences, especially violence.

Environments characterized by contested statehood and conflict must be considered against this backdrop. The possibility and profitability of transnational organized crime are both relatively high, either because of lower levels of regulatory capacity, social cohesion, and higher corruptibility, or because the resources acquired through illicit activities are easily used to gain political and economic power. Pre-2012, Mali illustrates well how central elites worked with illicit networks to govern, benefit financially, and sustain their hold on power. The global embedding of these environments magnifies opportunities for profit; stark inequalities in the face of poverty enable criminals to establish a socially attractive, and at times legitimate, way of life.

Talk among developed countries, conveniently sidestepping their own role, is of a tidal wave of crime. Reality is both more reassuring and more alarming. It is reassuring because these countries have the means to reduce the influence of crime on politics and the formal economy, monitor how it penetrates society, and minimize its social harm. It is also alarming because organized crime is more akin to a parasite than to a tidal wave—in perfect symbiosis with its host and therefore more difficult to detect.

Three broad actions are indicated to address this complex reality at the global level:

1. Ensure stringent enforcement of regulations, in particular pertaining to the diligence and record-keeping obligations of financial intermediaries, so that laundering profits becomes more difficult. We know what needs to be done, but powerful lobbies and profits stand in the way.

2. Take extreme care in strengthening law enforcement on the front line of fighting organized crime in fragile countries (the Economist’s problematic approach to terrorism is not to be emulated), because the elites of these countries are often complicit.

3. Increase development cooperation to address organized crime, but focus on reducing violence and increasing social stability, possibly on the basis of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States combined with a thorough understanding of the local political economy and its global entanglements.

These steps will not, as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) would have it, “put them out of business,” but they will emphasize reducing global socio-political harm.

Erwin van Veen is a senior research fellow at Clingendael’s Conflict Research Unit. He researches the political economy of change processes in conflict-affected environments, focusing on security- and justice-related issues and the Middle East.
Organized crime, long considered a law and order problem, is now becoming part of development policy and other agendas. This shift reflects growing recognition that armed violence and associated fragility related to organized crime require that policymakers and practitioners work across all related sectors: law enforcement and crime prevention, security and diplomacy, development and peacebuilding, and public health.

Designing interventions that draw on the scope of skills and approaches of peacebuilders is critical to a new generation of crime responses. Several areas are especially important:

› Rounded conflict analysis of the nexus of organized crime, armed violence, and fragility in any given context, understanding the political economy, and differentiating among root causes, proximate causes, and triggers will help inform more holistic responses.

› Often initiated, facilitated, and sustained by impartial or expert third parties, dialogue on conflict issues will incorporate and empower the actors involved in and affected by the problem to generate solutions together.

› Lasting solutions—despite the tendency of traditional law and order approaches to exclude civil society perspectives—will be found in civic activism and empowerment.

International Alert’s research in Rio de Janeiro, the Mano River Union countries of West Africa, and the Philippines, points to five priority areas for addressing organized crime and fragility:

1. Ensuring ‘do no harm’ law enforcement. Learning from experiences in which law enforcement led to an increase in violence is critical. Conflict-sensitive approaches would enhance this effort.

2. Improving analysis and information flow. Enormous knowledge gaps remain, particularly in the public realm. Greater analytical purchase across all global, national, and localized dimensions will facilitate better monitoring of the impact of policy responses.


4. Tackling crime incentive structures, including widening inequality. A better understanding of why individuals are drawn into crime is imperative. Targeted livelihood opportunities for at-risk populations as a direct response is one potential area of focus.

5. Disrupting globalized market structures. Developed countries that receive and consume illegal goods need to address their side of the problem as much as producer and intermediary countries need to deal with theirs. The debates are detailed and complex. Meaningful reflection has begun but must accelerate if transformation of the difficult issues at hand is to be achieved.

Steps can be taken to narrow the boundary between crime and politics as well as encouraging experiences of factoring criminal agendas into peace negotiations and processes.


Jessie Banfield is an 11-year veteran of International Alert, leading policy and research activities on economic dimensions of peace and conflict as Country Manager in Uganda, and Africa Programme Manager. Since recently leaving Alert, she has been working as an independent consultant.
Diamonds and gold have an intensely emotional as well as monetary and industrial value. They symbolize love, romance, friendship, and far, far more. Human rights and environmental campaigners were onto something when they first targeted diamonds and then gold. The story of blood diamonds and conflict gold—minerals mined in war zones and sold to finance an insurgency, war effort, or warlord—threatened to change the emotional equation. The industry reaction was positive: the jewelry sector, along with key nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), helped design systems to promote conflict-free diamond supply chains. By the time the movie Blood Diamond hit theaters, the dire situation it depicted in Sierra Leone had improved dramatically.

Tantalum, tungsten, and tin are also highly-prized, integral in the manufacture of computers and cell phones. While electronics are important purchases, the emotional transaction is not the same as with diamonds and gold. Yet whether we are buying a wedding ring or a cell phone, society wants to know that no harm was done and that our purchases contribute to peace and development. Investors and their shareholders feel much the same: they want to be sure that the money they raise on stock markets in New York, London, Toronto, and Sydney is not creating liabilities for human rights, or to the reputations of their companies.

The electronics industry, like the jewelry sector, moved quickly and effectively to support supply-chain transparency. In February 2014, Greenpeace campaigner Tom Dowdall spoke of “Apple’s increased transparency about its suppliers” as “a hallmark of Tim Cook’s leadership at the company.” The Enough Project, which supports peace and human rights in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), had similar praise for Intel, HP, and Motorola Solutions.

We have now moved beyond transparency to a new era, of shared responsibility for ethical supply chains that have potentially significant implications for peace, development, and the environment. Downstream companies, those that use minerals in their products, have shifted from a reactive posture to recognition that their brands and
Tantalum, tungsten, and tin are also highly-prized, integral in the manufacture of computers and cell phones.

products tell a story to consumers—including stories from upstream communities that provide the natural resources necessary for the manufacture of goods. The work of the World Gold Council on a conflict-free gold tool for its members is evidence of the support of upstream companies. This new orientation to supply chains contains seeds for development and peacebuilding because it ethically connects mining communities to the power of global brands. The greatest potential for positive, upstream impact comes when leadership is exerted across the total supply chain—miners, traders, processors, manufacturers, and consumer-facing brands—and includes the small-scale artisanal miner as well as global mining houses. Mining is but one example. The trend applies to other natural resource supply chains.

A Hopeful Moment

The time is ripe to focus on the role of the global extractive sector. Sector companies, development and peace NGOs, and development agencies are critical partners. The business case is supported by the growth of socially responsible investing, delays associated with social conflict at sites, the new wave of supply chain de-risking, and the commercial and development value of ore bodies in conflict-affected countries.

The sense today is one of growing confidence that industry, civil society, and government can partner to respond to resource challenges and conflicts. In the 1990s, producing oil in a conflict zone was considered by some to be a legitimate business decision. That view began to change when the Sudanese Presbyterian Church accused a company of genocide and took their grievances to court. The Global Mining Initiative, launched by the world’s major mining firms in the early 2000s, signaled a new orientation. Since then, a combination of public pressure and industry leadership has led to new commitments to global standards, greater transparency, and demonstrated development impact. Recent supply chain interventions supported by the electronics sectors and jewelers bring a new, positive dimension.

Today’s challenge may be greatest in the artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) sector, in which miners—whether individually or in small groups or networks—work by hand. Small-scale mining can be dangerous but provides income for tens of millions around the world. It also is in some regions linked to conflict and rights abuses. Signs of progress are evident, however.

The Kimberley Process (KP) to ban conflict diamonds transformed the global trade by establishing criminal penalties for any international transactions in uncertified rough diamonds. The KP has limitations, however. Some question the self-policing aspects of its governance system. Human rights organizations have been critical of the KP certification of diamonds from Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, the KP had a positive impact. More recently, the UN has adopted guidelines for business and human rights. The instability in the DRC after the Rwandan genocide prompted the UN Security Council to examine the role of natural resources in conflict for the first time, but it had no real mechanisms to do anything about it.

To implement a provision of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission required listed companies to report on their use of conflict minerals from the DRC and bordering countries; first reports were due this past June. Over the last few years, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) put forward guidelines on conflict-free due diligence for sensitive minerals, guidelines that are not restricted to the Central Africa region. The G8 ratified the conflict-free imperative for extractives with the 2013 G8 Lough Erne Declaration, which states that “minerals should be sourced legitimately, not plundered from conflict zones.”

Pathway to a Paradigm Shift

The rapid shift to shared responsibility for ethical natural resources has been remarkable. We have reached a tipping point, from whether to how questions—how best to initiate, organize, incentivize, and regulate.

The new paradigm has two elements: the transparent supply chain and the ethically mined and sourced mineral. In the upcoming phase, the larger mining companies and leaders in the ASM sector such as the Alliance for Responsible Mining and the Diamond Development Initiative become essential agents for transparency and development, in partnership with civil society and government, because it takes collaboration to build credible supply chains and promote in-region capacity building and development.

Large-scale mining companies are a critical peace and development partner in countries...
experiencing conflicts around mineral resources. Just a decade ago, the large-scale mining sector could largely ignore and differentiate itself from the artisanal and small-scale mining sector, including informal and illegal miners. They can no longer do so.

The World Bank reports some 100 million artisanal miners in about eighty countries contributing some 20 percent of the gold and diamond production worldwide as well as other strategic and high-value minerals. Development, like politics, can make strange bedfellows. New models are emerging for positive cohabitation by the large-scale mining sector, development agencies, human rights and development NGOs, and governments because all need solutions to the challenges and opportunities the ASM sector presents.

**Proof of Concept for Resource Diplomacy**

The most recent innovation in ethical supply chains is from the DRC, which only recently was ground zero for conflict minerals—the result of an intervention referred to as resource diplomacy. The premise of resource diplomacy is that voluntary, multi-sector intervention can play a unique role in building public-private partnerships to support in-region capacity building and bolster government processes. A new program, Solutions for Hope, is one example. (See Taking the Conflict Out of Conflict Minerals on page 22.) The program encourages supply-chain innovation and direct sourcing from conflict-free sites in countries of concern, mixing supply-chain transparency with development strategies linked to supply-chain incentives.

**Challenges and Opportunities**

A new norm is fast unfolding in the extractive sector that will touch every link of the supply chain for sensitive minerals: mining investors, manufacturers, retailers, consumers, and governments will want to know that companies are clean of conflict both upstream and downstream. OECD guidance and other initiatives make this possible. This will extend to other commodities and products.

Yet whether we are buying a wedding ring or a cell phone, society wants to know that no harm was done and that our purchases contribute to peace and development.
In 2007, the electronics industry became the target of activist groups who argued that downstream companies to artisanal mining were contributing to violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). At the same time, many recognized that the industry could also be a positive force. Subsequent studies highlighted a significant lack of transparency in the global supply chain for tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold, and that most companies did not know the origin of the minerals they used. In response, the industry launched two initiatives to establish systems of traceability and transparency in the supply chain while supporting legitimate sourcing of DRC minerals.

In 2010, artisanal mining activities in eastern DRC slowed to a near standstill in the wake of the DRC presidential mining suspension and the passing of Section 1502 of the US Dodd-Frank Act. Section 1502 covers assessment and reporting requirements for all US publicly-traded companies whose products contain tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold which the Act defines as conflict minerals. The suspension and Section 1502 were meant to target mafia-like groups benefiting from artisanal mining, but the effect was indiscriminate and global markets felt the effect.

Official exports of tin, tantalum, and tungsten from the Kivus and Maniema Provinces, a UN Group of Experts reported, essentially stopped. The DRC is rich, for example, in coltan, a mineral that contains tantalum, which is used in capacitors found in electronics and other devices. Prices of tantalum spiked after the ban, given that
approximately 15 percent of the world’s supply originates in the DRC, creating particular uncertainty in the electronics industry, which accounts for up to 60 percent of tantalum use worldwide.

In early 2011, the mining suspension was lifted, but in its place came a de facto embargo as companies had begun to see sourcing from the region as a risk. As a result, the industry came under enormous pressure to support economic development in the region, though new systems had not been fully tested and downstream companies, most of which are removed from the mining process itself, were not even sure how to directly engage.

Under these conditions, Solutions for Hope was born. Launched in July, 2011 in the DRC’s Katanga Province, the program created its closed-pipe supply model, which uses a defined set of supply chain suppliers. The project built industry-wide confidence by showing that transparent sourcing is possible, supported the development and implementation of existing initiatives, and provided a conflict-free source of tantalum that would support the continuity of supply and minimize pricing fluctuations in the global supply chain.

Legitimizing the minerals trade in the DRC is critical to creating a peace economy in the African Great Lakes region. Solutions for Hope creates economic benefits for artisanal miners, their families, and communities.

For miners, the program demonstrates that legitimate material is sold in line with global pricing and not discounted, thus allowing more money to remain in the region and improve the livelihoods of those involved.

For miners, the program demonstrates that legitimate material is sold in line with global pricing and not discounted, thus allowing more money to remain in the region and improve the livelihoods of those involved. Another critical aspect of the project is its community reinvestment component which, in this case, helped implement infrastructure and social programs such as roads, bridges, medical facilities, and schools. Proof of concept is thus demonstrated.

The notion that the concept is also scalable came when Solutions for Hope inspired the Conflict-Free Tin Initiative, funded by the Dutch Foreign Ministry in 2012 to source tin from South Kivu Province using the closed-pipe model. In a more recent effort, a multi-stakeholder meeting convened in February, 2014 by the US nonprofit RESOLVE, yielded the Cadenas de Paz (Spanish for “chains of peace”) project in Colombia, a transparency and development program to support OECD compliance with supply-chain due diligence.

The closed-pipe supply line approach has the potential to prevent natural resource conflicts when it is used as part of a broader, private-sector strategy to ensure supply chain transparency and incentives. The future of Solutions for Hope is to move from pilots to best practice and it is continuing to look for partners to replicate and innovate.

Michael Loch is Director of Supply Chain Corporate Responsibility for Motorola Solutions. He has played a major role in the development and implementation of Solutions for Hope and the Public Private Alliance for Responsible Minerals Trade where he serves on the Governance Committee. He also chairs the Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative.

Most companies did not know the origin of the minerals they used. In response, the industry launched two initiatives to establish systems of traceability and transparency in the supply chain.
Most people do not trust their governments. Surveys suggest that worldwide, across the general public and among decision makers, the figure is now below 45 percent. This growing deficit looks set to drive future instability and conflict as increasing numbers of people feel excluded and shift their loyalties. Fractures can occur along regional, ethnic and tribal, or economic lines—and typically a combination of them. Syria, Sudan, Iraq, Nigeria, and the states of the former Yugoslavia are just a few examples of broken states.

The picture is not all bleak, however. In the last decade, Colombia, Rwanda, Nepal, and Sierra Leone, to name a few, have all made impressive strides in advancing accountable and inclusive governance. Some are breaking free of conflict traps and many more are harnessing drivers for growth and stability: young populations, significant natural resources, and technology.

What does governance mean, and what is good governance? Getting governance right is both political and technical. What can appear as tedious technicalities in functioning states assume critical importance in states where good governance is lacking. The heart of governance is accountability, which requires knowledge of procurement, accounting, and auditing. Governance is not abstract. It exists in reference to the governance of particular sectors, services, and assets: governing the security sector is quite different from governing the health sector or the extractive assets. The shape of governance will, of course, vary by state.

Some countries, however, remain locked in a self-reinforcing trap of conflict and weak governance wherein dissatisfaction drives conflict, which in turn fuels mistrust. Pakistan, Nigeria, Mali, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have recently dropped on several international indices. Subnational conflicts persist in Nigeria, India, and the Philippines, where popular grievances over exclusion and governance continue. Meanwhile, violent crime is on the rise in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala; their citizens’ loss of trust in their countries’ futures has fueled a wave of migration quickly becoming a humanitarian emergency.

In many such places, the drivers of economic growth are a double-edged sword; growing populations, expanding cities, and hyper-connectedness are also risk factors. Many struggling cities and states are already unable to provide services to their populations, a problem that dramatic population growth will only compound. The illicit economy’s tentacles choke government resources and capacity, and illegitimate flows often overwhelm the legitimate.

Weakening states, strained resources, shadow economies, and swelling and increasingly
Weakening states, strained resources, shadow economies, and swelling and increasingly digitalized populations challenge government legitimacy, widening the gap between what is expected of governments and what they deliver. In many cases, the gap leads to violence.

digitalized populations challenge government legitimacy. Their cumulative effect tends to widen the gap between what is expected of governments and what they deliver. In many cases, the gap leads to violence.

How can this trajectory be reversed? External intervention has recognizable limitations, as demonstrated by the gap between investment and outcomes in Afghanistan and Iraq. Successful transformations are more commonly driven from within when internal conditions create momentum for change, such as in Colombia. Can external aid reduce the legitimacy gap? In theory, yes. In practice, it can exacerbate it. Aid problems result from unequal distribution, practices that fragment rule of law, and population marginalization and alienation. Bypassing government institutions, an aid-based shadow state—however benignly intentioned—can cause exactly the same problems as a crime- or corruption-based shadow state, such as in Equatorial Guinea.

What, then, is behind successful transformations? The key drivers appear to be a combination of good leadership and the creation of favorable political conditions. Good leadership is characterized by inclusiveness: the will and means to reach beyond a narrow constituency of self-interest. Favorable conditions enable coalitions of moderate constituencies to coalesce around an agenda for political change. Peace processes and elections certainly contribute to transformations, but are not enough on their own.

The key to resolving legitimacy gaps is governance quality—the extent to which it meets citizen expectations, for fairness and inclusion in particular. Successful peace processes generally embody this principle, and if the internal processes are well designed, external support can reinforce stability.

The wrong kind of peace deals, such as pacts among extremist elites, can exacerbate legitimacy gaps because of their inherent unfairness as well as the conditions for corruption and misgovernance they create. Peace deals, even elite pacts, are certainly compelling given their promise of temporary respite from conflict. Elite deals often prop up countries back to conflict, however, in an ever-worsening spiral of bad governance, criminality, and mistrust.

Natural resources are also critical to most peace deals. Sound resource management can drive prosperity and peace; poor management, and especially inequitable distribution, can often drive conflict. Power-sharing deals that carve up the state and its ministries as spoils of war struggle to achieve long-term peace. By allocating the right to live off revenues and to sell assets and sinecures, they entrench networks of corruption, and by formalizing inequalities they sow the seeds of their own destruction. When the driving grievance is bad governance, providing large constituencies with fair governance will fare better than providing narrow groups with a license to steal.

With these principles in mind, peacemakers must scrutinize which type of peace process will lead to greater stability and when, as well as what the linkages between peace and governance are. A few common principles underpin recent peacemaking efforts:

1. Recognizing that the citizenry provides the most durable source of stability and legitimacy, that broad engagement rather than token representation is critical.
2. Having a plan for the day after, because governing—inclusively, fairly, and justly—is far more important than either forming the government or striking the deal if peace is to last.
3. Allocating decision rights judiciously and establishing the right forms of accountability at the most appropriate level because decentralization alone is not the whole answer.
4. Finding the right mesh between bureaucratic and tribal and traditional forms of governance because one model never fits all.
5. Understanding that, for most citizens, security is a good and maintaining order a key priority—the question of establishing a legitimate monopoly on the use of force is still a concern in many countries.

Recognizing that all contexts are different from each other, these principles can offer some guidance for peacemakers both within civil society and government in their efforts to build, create, and maintain peaceful societies.

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Fifty years ago, Lake Chad in Africa had a surface area of 25,000 square kilometers. Today, it has less than 2,000. The surface area of the Aral Sea in Central Asia has dropped by half, from 66,000 to 33,000 km², and the Dead Sea in the Middle East from almost 1,000 to 650 km². Fifty years from now, Lake Chad is at risk of disappearing altogether. Thirty years from now, the Aral Sea and the Dead Sea may become small lakes. China, the emerging superpower, may soon see Lake Poyang, its largest freshwater lake, evaporate—as many as 3,000 small lakes in the source region of the Yellow River have done so in the last two decades.

As lakes disappear, rivers are either being depleted or severely polluted. Large stretches of the Ganges, the Nile, and the Yangtze are already biologically dead. Over the next thirty years, some of the mightiest rivers in the world—including the Yellow and the Yangtze, the Ganges and the Indus, the Euphrates and the Jordan, and the Nile—will see a reduction of at least 25 to 30 percent in their flow from evaporation, desertification, climate change, and pollution. The climate change debate is highly focused on atmospheric pollution and energy, but there is a growing realization of the close links between climatic and environmental factors and the future flow and quality of water through melting glaciers, deforestation, changes in precipitation, and emission of waste into fresh water.

The next thirty years will also see a strong increase in demand for water—for hydroelectricity, irrigation, and urbanization. At the same time, the 25-30 percent reduction in water flow will lead to a drop in food grain production in China, India, Bangladesh,
Egypt, and the Middle East. The net result of this decrease will be a gap between demand and supply of food grains of approximately 200 to 300 million tons by 2040 in international markets. China and India, reasonably self-sufficient in 2014, may become major importers of food grains by 2040. If all this unfolds, commodity prices will skyrocket, affecting the poor worldwide and making food riots, migration, and conflicts within and between countries inevitable.

The main theater of crisis and conflict driven by depletion of water resources will be from Southeast Asia via South Asia and Central Asia to Turkey and from Egypt along the eastern and central parts of Africa to Kenya and Burundi (See Figure 1).

What could change this ominous scenario? The good news is that mere decline in the availability of water does not necessarily lead to violence. Singapore and Senegal are examples of how to avoid conflicts through good water governance and transboundary cooperation.

A recent study by Strategic Foresight Group (SFG) on 205 shared river basins from 148 countries concludes: “Any two countries engaged in active water cooperation do not go to war for any reason whatsoever, including land, religion, economy or terrorism.” The key to peace thus lies in the intensity of cooperation as measured by the water cooperation quotient (WCQ) the report introduces. The WCQ is a new tool developed by SFG and introduced to the international community by HRH Prince Hassan, Chairman of UN Secretary General’s Water Board. It uses ten parameters—including economic, environmental, institutional, legal, political, and technical factors—to examine both legal and operational cooperation between countries that share a water body. Countries are assessed on a scale of 0 to 100, with countries at risk scoring below 35.

To promote active water cooperation, the Blue Peace framework—which defines a structured process to turn water from a source of potential crisis to an instrument of cooperation—is essential. Specifically, it consists of creating regional mechanisms for cooperation, engaging mainstream political leaders from rival riparian countries, and enabling them to negotiate trade-offs between water and other public goods. Such mechanisms are already in place in Europe, North and South America, and West Africa.

The next decade will see the emergence of global mechanisms—both innovative legal and diplomatic instruments—for resolving water-related disputes and promoting transboundary water cooperation. If the international community mobilizes political will behind the new architecture of water and peace, the alternative grim scenario of water war can still be averted before the world crosses the tipping point.

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“Any two countries engaged in active water cooperation do not go to war for any reason whatsoever, including land, religion, economy or terrorism.”
While there is still much we do not know about how to achieve, sustain, and maintain peace, it is clear that peace is necessary for a community to thrive. However, achieving peace is not as simple as increasing investment in peacebuilding initiatives. This is a necessary first step, but hardly sufficient. Building peace is a complex, long-term, multi-faceted endeavor that requires more reliable information to make better program design, investment, and policy decisions. Monitoring and evaluation (M & E)—when resourced adequately, practiced well, and integrated at every level of program design and implementation, decision-making, and policymaking—can prove what did or didn’t happen and help improve decisions and practice the next time around.

For instance, a collaborative effort among CARE International and other local and international NGOs, municipal governments, and international organizations was examined by CDA Collaborative Learning to determine why there was a marked lack of violence in certain communities during the widespread riots of 2004 in Kosovo. Contrary to what many thought would prevent violence in these interethnic communities, the research found that places with greater interethnic interaction did not experience less violence. In fact, prevention strategies that focused on promoting multi-ethnicity actually had the unintended consequence of intensifying divisions. Unexpected insights into the effects of peacebuilding programs such as these,
highlight the critical importance of reflection through monitoring and evaluation.

However, evaluation practices and their ability to provide evidence in peacebuilding are still nascent. Over the past two decades, the peacebuilding community has made significant strides in its evaluation practice by making evaluation a requirement of program funding, developing technical guidance and tools to build evaluation capacity and developing structures and multi-sector partnerships that foster shared learning and increased methodological rigor. Now, 2015 has been designated the International Year of Evaluation by a variety of global organizations and agencies. With stakeholders from around the world highlighting the need for better evaluation, it will be a benchmark year that can be used to assess progress on measuring and learning into the future.

When I asked a variety of evaluation experts from around the world where they thought the field would be—should be—in its evaluation practice in another two decades, I was struck by the normality of their answers. Most saw the future of evaluation as simply a more consistent application of what we already know to be evaluation best practices in the present:

» Fully-integrated stakeholder and civil society input and involvement at every stage of the program design, evaluation, and learning process. Today, there is still a lack of real local representation in program design and evaluation. For instance, women’s participation is one of the key aspects of the peace process in Afghanistan. Female leaders from civil society organizations around the country are representing Afghani women in the peacebuilding process. As important as their role is, do these highly-educated and experienced women represent the average woman? If the answer is no, how then will a more truly representative group of women be integrated into programs and evaluation? Ideally, reflection and strong monitoring and evaluation would highlight programming gaps like this—and allow for changes to be made.

» More equitable relationships between external evaluators who come in to assess a program and internal staff roles. This trend is already beginning with the increased popularity of participatory methods like developmental evaluation and action evaluation. It is particularly useful in highly-dynamic conflict contexts, where rapid programming adaptation is needed, and in complex situations. Online access to evaluation trainings, networks, resources, mentorship, and guidance on how to use evaluation data to make decisions will become more readily available regardless of one’s location or funds, making exchanges among internal staff and external evaluators somewhat more even.

» Real-time, applied learning based on continuous feedback loops from ongoing programs. Evaluation tends to be practiced as a siloed activity at the end of a program. Ideally, technical steps like baselines and the systemic thinking about the complexity of the program and context, will be a given so that what is now called evaluation will become embedded in peacebuilding practice.

» Good evidence will not be defined by the use of a handful of expensive, quantitative evaluation methodologies. Methodologies that were not created with complexity in mind, for instance those that originated in clinical environments holding certain variables constant while other variables were tested, will not limit the definition and validity of evidence. Instead, a wide spectrum of more nuanced processes and methods that can be applied at various points in a program cycle will be incorporated.

» Evaluation findings will be used to adjust not just peacebuilding, but development and security programs, policies and approaches through calculated, stakeholder-led, and thoughtful risks. The current funding model of peacebuilding necessitates a degree of accountability. A donor has the right to know whether or not an organization used allocated funds as they said they would. More importantly though, local partners and communities need to know how programs and actions led by international actors have affected their lives and their future. As better evaluation efforts and analysis of those findings lead to better accountability with local partners, local communities will be able to have a higher degree of say in adjusting programs.

As complex as this list may sound, we can start to implement these evaluation trends and practices today. We know what needs to be done, and we know how to do it. But some challenges do exist to realizing this vision. Public and private funders operate under a number of pressures that create unrealistic expectations and timeframes for “successful” results and peace efforts. A scarcity of funds leads program staff to perceive monitoring and evaluation as a competitor, rather than an enabler, of program activities. At the same time, donor
requirements reinforce the impression that M&E is externally imposed, rather than an integral part of good practice and learning. Consequently, many organizations fail to include M&E in personnel assessments. With neither incentives nor consequences for M&E, there is a low perceived need for learning and/or feedback. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the overall system is not designed to be accountable to local needs and priorities. Programs are generally designed in response to donor requirements or in line with an organization’s favorite methodologies.

The future of peacebuilding evaluation—and accordingly, the legitimacy of peacebuilding practice—will be based on a shift of attitudes that welcomes calculated, evidence-based risks, funds good research, and encourages a redefinition—and reconditioning of the consequences—of success and failure. As a new generation of peacebuilders, funders, and policymakers brings a comfort and familiarity with technology and an ever-increasing human interconnectedness gives people even more options to choose from, metrics will become even more important to help them gauge whether or not they made the right decision, and if they should make that choice again. Future success will depend on how well we, as a field, can face the day-to-day uncertainty in conflict zones and allow for the flexibility, responsiveness, and inclusion of local partners as leaders that are necessary for effective peacebuilding.

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With input from: Robert Berg, Founding Director of Evaluation, the US Agency for International Development and the Founding Chair of Evaluation, OECD-DAC; Andrew Blum, Vice President for Program Management and Evaluation, the US Institute of Peace; Diana Chigas, Co-Director of the Reflecting on Peace Program, CDA Collaborative Learning; Vanessa Corlazolli, Senior DM&E Manager, Institutional Learning, Search for Common Ground; Asela Kalugampitiya, International Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, UN Population Fund, Sri Lanka; Thania Paffenholz, Senior Researcher, the Graduate Institute’s Centre on Conflict, Peacebuilding and Development; Peter Woodrow, Executive Director, CDA Collaborative Learning.
In 1922, not long after the end of the “war to end all wars” and at the beginning of what has since proved one of the bloodiest centuries in recorded history, the French scientist and theologian Pierre Teilhard de Chardin envisioned everyone’s being able to communicate with everyone, swiftly and efficiently. This vision was not the Internet but what he called a global “realm of the mind.” It would, he maintained, provide a profound impetus to peace. Contrary to Thomas Hobbes’s notion of a world driven by “the war of all against all,” Teilhard’s notion was of a global consciousness. What he termed the noosphere—a neologism whose root is the Greek noos, meaning mind—was, in his view, the next step in the evolution of mankind toward an ethical paradigm more concerned with pursuing what is right than with the power politics of might.

Sadly, two global wars and countless insurgencies have been waged since then. Social revolutions and modern networked terrorism have become commonplace. Nation-states have proliferated, many of them—like South Sudan—born failing. It is ironic that the United Nations, which has seen its membership grow nearly four-fold since its founding in 1945, has been able to do so little to contain or reverse the course of conflict and suffering, especially in those places where the innocent and helpless are the most preyed upon.

Cause for concern is no less when it comes to the fundamental peace paradigm of our time—that the spread of democracy will contribute to global amity. This concept was in fact first articulated by Immanuel Kant in his 1795 essay “Perpetual Peace.” The past decade of American-led efforts to pursue a Kantian democracy agenda by force of
arms, however, has for the most part simply brought fresh miseries—to Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and beyond. Perhaps the problem is not with democratization per se, but that US foreign policy has become far too militarized—a by-product of the realpolitik-oriented belief that the dissolution of the Soviet Union left America alone in a position of global leadership. The costly, mixed military results of Washington’s wars since 9/11 may thus reflect an over-reliance on force—and its corollary, continuing policy blindness toward the great opportunity to test Teilhard’s intriguing hypothesis about connectivity and amity.

It is now fifteen years since David Ronfeldt and I advanced the argument that the Internet and World Wide Web were not only realizing Teilhard’s dream of a noosphere, but that their rise heralded the emergence of noopolitik, a mode of statecraft driven by the attractiveness of ethical values that form the core of our common humanity. This is something much more than soft power, which is all about persuasiveness, and which can be used for good or ill. Noopolitik is about acknowledging what is right and just, as a basis for negotiated settlements to conflict, peaceful interactions, and the protection of human dignity.

Unfortunately, this idea remains “on the shelf,” not only in the United States, but also in most halls of power in all too many nation-states. The sword is not yet sheathed. Some glimmerings of noopolitik can be seen in nineteenth-century antislavery movements as well as in early civil society efforts to curb colonial abuses of indigenous peoples. The telegraph, what Tom Standage has called the Victorian Internet, helped these movements back then. Today, the global consciousness that technology has wrought has the opportunity to go even further, creating a global conscience as well. That this has not yet happened is testament to the persistent pull of realpolitik. This is sadly so, given the poor results—at massive material and human cost—of power politics in our time.

Clearly, Teilhard’s moment has come. The noosphere is here. Noopolitik looms, if we but see it, and humankind’s transcendental destination is within reach. In today’s world, we are constantly reminded of the darker aspects of increased connectivity: more intrusive intelligence gathering, aggressive cyberwarfare, and cyberterrorism. What we don’t think about enough is the role that “cyber” can play in fostering peace by forging global interconnections—this was Teilhard’s dream. What if we, too, could imagine the Internet serving as a vehicle for cooperation, the sharing of hopeful stories; the communications link between moderate citizens creating positive social change; and as a voice for democratic action? Many peacebuilding organizations are already doing this; for example, Soliya’s online platform for improving understanding between American and Middle Eastern students. If movements of this sort can thrive and multiply, then perhaps Teilhard’s vision of a peaceful noosphere will be realized.

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The noosphere was … the next step in the evolution of mankind toward an ethical paradigm more concerned with pursuing what is right than with the power politics of might.
We didn’t know what the word “tsunami” meant when it hit Sri Lanka on December 26, 2004. But our ignorance extended far beyond meteorological phenomena—ten years ago, lives were lost because information and communications technologies around early warning and response were non-existent. Officials from the government’s meteorology department, who didn’t realize a tsunami was entirely unrelated to atmospheric conditions, tried to address mass panic over radio and TV saying the skies would be clear. With no early warning in place, no training on what to do, where to go, or where to turn for updates, a disaster occurred that could have been largely prevented. The tsunami was a wake-up call around how desperately countries impacted by the tragedy needed more resilient and effective mechanisms around disaster warning.

Since 2004, despite vast technological advancements in ‘last-mile’ alerting—aimed at providing communities with a system to receive hazard information for early warning, common alerting protocols, and apps on smartphones to by-the-minute updates over social media, complex challenges remain. Policy-making around more efficient and effective disaster response, preparedness, and recovery can become mired in bureaucracy. Sharing knowledge in a timely and effective manner often remains hostage to officials and senior leadership that believe hoarding information is more important than releasing it to other agencies, humanitarian actors, and a broader public.

Even with a shared goal of saving lives, information flow can be slow or even become trapped across various agencies and departments. Early-warning and disaster-response platforms have become increasingly successful in generating, disseminating, analyzing, and visualizing critical information. At the same time, they have become less capable of seamlessly sharing information with other systems, standards, and platforms used by others for the same relief operations. At the time of the tsunami, it was a lack of information and awareness that killed so many. Ten years hence, it is information scatter, data lock-in, and the lack of coherent governance around information dissemination that continues to impede the effective and efficient response to emergencies.

Beyond natural disasters, peacebuilding praxis has also seen unprecedented growth in the use of technology for positive, constructive action—in just over a decade—from early warning and response to post-war recovery and rebuilding. A plethora of examples can be found around the world, from simple mobile apps (e.g. what is already used in Afghanistan around the use of mobile phones in peacebuilding) and text messaging (e.g. PeaceTXT) to the use of big data for peacebuilding. Some governments now have official Twitter hashtags for crises, allowing users to easily find information in emergencies. And yet without, for example, investments around media literacy within fragile societies or with a repressive polity, technology growth also creates the space for rumour and propaganda to exacerbate violence. An ill-timed or malicious SMS can transmit violence and violent responses almost instantaneously across vast distances in the way that, at the start of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, for instance, hateful and incendiary messages were transmitted via radio.

Most policymakers now grasp the positive potential of technology, but there are less positive, more hurtful applications as well. The central challenge today, shared by the UN, civil society, governments, Bretton Woods institutions and others, is to outsmart technologies that help promote hate, hurt and harm and instead, imagine and promote technological content and initiatives to counter radicalization and build resilience. From ISIS in Iraq to the promotion of hate speech in Sri Lanka by militant monks, social media, the Internet, and mobile apps are also used to fan violence. Success in countering this online incitement language depends on many factors; key among them are governance and leadership, innovations in technology (e.g. mesh networking to serve rural communities), and strategic investments in content generation to counter hate (e.g. Umati).

The progress, potential, and new challenges of technology provoke a simple question of us: we all often say technology saves lives, but how far and much are we willing to really invest to make sure it really does?

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From ISIS in Iraq to the promotion of hate speech in Sri Lanka by militant monks, social media, the Internet, and mobile apps are also used to fan violence.
The title of David Kilcullen’s latest volume, *Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla*, takes a leaf from Osama bin Laden’s book. According to a CNN reporter, bin Laden told his sons to memorize every rock and pebble on the routes between Tora Bora in Pakistan and their various compounds in Afghanistan. “We never know when war will strike...we must know our way out of the mountains.” Kilcullen is, of course, making a broader point beyond the life-preserving benefits of high-altitude orienteering; he is reminding readers that the defining experience of war for the most recent generation of western militaries is Afghanistan and Iraq. These were irregular conflicts taking place predominantly in rural, landlocked areas, and against conventional enemies. He is also making a plea—to military tacticians, aid workers and diplomats—to get their heads out of the mountains and see the future for what it is: urban, coastal, and networked.

The central thrust of David Kilcullen’s book is elegantly simple: he is proposing a grand narrative for the future of warfare, or “forever wars,” and recommending that war-fighters and peacebuilders prepare themselves accordingly. Kilcullen elaborates what he refers to as four key megatrends—population growth, urbanization, littoralization (the tendency of populations to cluster on coastlines) and networked connectivity—which together are shaping chaos and
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disorder in the twenty-first century. In so doing, he is warning the world’s future diplomats, soldiers, and aid workers that they must anticipate these trends and learn how to mitigate their associated risks. What is more, they would do well to support local institutions if they—that is everyone—is to thrive and live in a future free of fear. If they fail to do all of this, Kilcullen is convinced that the world will be confronted with rampant, out-of-control, and unending violence.

There is a touch of déjà-vu in Kilcullen’s treatment of the transformation of organized violence. Drawing on the carefully-cited work of a plethora of scholars, he argues that irregular wars—military operations against non-state actors—are supplanting conventional wars. He confirms the obvious in saying that warfare in various guises will undoubtedly continue, conflict being the permanent social institution that it is. None of this is new (nor does Kilcullen imply as much). Yet it is his treatment of how the contexts of these wars—the underlying demographic, geographic, and technological environments—are undergoing profound changes that is novel. Kilcullen’s contribution is in the way he conjures up a unified theory for future conflict. And in the process, he repeatedly pays tribute to the many gurus who helped him assemble the pieces.

After all, demographers, geographers and technologists have been busy making analogous predictions for years. Demographers around the world have projected breakneck population growth in the twenty-first century—especially in under-developed coastal, or littoral, areas—and have linked this transition to unrest. Meanwhile, urban planners have documented how a massive shift in humanity is occurring from rural areas to cities and their peripheries, especially in the Americas, Africa, and Asia, resulting in sprawling conurbations, hyper-cities, and megacities. Likewise, futurists routinely describe how unprecedented increases in connectivity are catalyzing new forms of open empowerment along with digital (and real) revolution. But few authors before Kilcullen have brought these otherwise disparate strands together so tightly.

Kilcullen is clearly fascinated with his grand theory of convergence. And in his haste to set it out, he unintentionally constructs a few straw men. He claims to reject simplistic or “binary” explanations of war with their assumption of a single defining risk factor. He also disdains “academic” views of insurgency, terrorism, narcotics, and gangs that work in splendid isolation of one another. Instead, Kilcullen favors an “ecosystem” approach that envisions conflicts as nonlinear, many-sided, and messy. Yet there are few serious scholars or practitioners who would disagree with this characterization, regardless of whether they have field experience or not. And there is growing interest in analogous concepts drawn from ecosystems theory such as “resilience” that explain how societies cope, adapt, and potentially build back better in the midst of war and disaster. Many of Kilcullen’s ideas are very much aligned with established thinking in donor, defense, and development circuits. Out of the Mountains nevertheless reinforces the importance of thinking differently about future engagement in the world’s urban hotspots. First, drawing on examples as wide-ranging as Afghanistan, Colombia, Jamaica, Mexico, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, he urges readers to see cities as living organisms and harness the potential of their residents. This means designing public safety into the architecture of cities, planning participatory and community-based systems of monitoring, and investing in environmental design approaches such as charter agreements co-designed with local residents. As any aid worker knows, more police and soldiers is not a sustainable solution. Second, Kilcullen shows how urban safety is a necessary but insufficient measure of successful intervention. What is needed is not just more security and reduction of violence, but also an acceptable level of service provision and functioning urban environments. Third, he draws attention to the transformative nature of new technologies and connectivity. People can connect with national and international information flows to an unprecedented degree, however ineffective the government.

While there is much to redeem Out of the Mountains, it does have a whiff of dystopia about it. Kilcullen writes with the same pace and pessimism as Robert Kaplan (The Coming Anarchy) and Mike Davis (Planet of the Slums). He also brings that same hardened vision from the frontlines, moving with unnerving speed between the world’s most intractable war zones and ungoverned spaces. There are times when the prose slips into deterministic and even Malthusian tones, especially when describing specific cities in Africa and South Asia. He writes ominously of “carrying capacities” of developing country cities, the rise of pandemics.
While hard to deny that these threats exist in fragile cities such as Karachi and Lagos, are they really worldwide trends? Are they exclusive only to low- and middle-income cities? Do we not see similar challenges in inner-city neighborhoods of Baltimore, Detroit, New Orleans or Oakland where homicide rates often rival those of urban centers in the Americas, Africa, and Asia?

Owing to his wide-ranging experience in counter-insurgency from around the world, Kilcullen is well placed to stitch together a grand narrative. Yet in constructing his meta-theory, he also risks oversimplifying the commonalities between settings as varied as Kingston, Kabul, and Karachi. And there is one final puzzling question that some readers, this one included, might ask part-way through the volume: who, ultimately, is the end reader of this volume? As the author himself acknowledges, militaries and urban planners have long anticipated the inexorable pressures shaping city growth and conflict. Counter-insurgency manuals in the US have also acknowledged these trends for years, as have an increasing number of development and relief agencies. The book’s subtitle, The Coming Age of the Urban Guerilla, suggests that the target audience is primarily western militaries. If that is the case, will they be entirely surprised by what Kilcullen has to say? If, instead, the book is also targeting diplomats and aid workers, then it may in fact inspire a new generation to prepare themselves for the coming storm.

Robert Muggah is Research Director of the Igarapé Institute in Brazil and also directs the SecDev Foundation in Canada. In addition to advising the United Nations and World Bank, he works with new technology groups to develop data-driven tools to improve safety and security.
Big Men gives viewers fly-on-the-wall access to boardrooms of billion-dollar oil deals, intimate chats with African royalty, and strategy sessions with an underground militant group as the story behind big oil unfolds in a compelling mix of capitalism, corruption, and greed. Filmmaker Rachel Boynton set out to illustrate what happens when American corporate interests meet West African politics while probing broader questions of human nature and motivation.

At the center of the storyline is Jubilee oil field. Discovered off the coast of Ghana in 2007, Jubilee was big news: with proven reserves of 3 billion barrels and the first commercial oil field in Ghanaian history, its development was received with great anticipation by the Ghanaian people . . . and its American investors braced for generous profits.

The film follows the diverse cast of characters Jubilee brings together: George Owusu, the Ghanaian entrepreneur whose efforts led to its discovery; Kosmos Energy, the small, Dallas-based start-up that claimed Jubilee and did the drilling under the direction of its President and Founder, John Musselman; the Wall Street investors whose millions funded the vast endeavor; and the Ghanaian politicians who represent their country in the proceedings.

Juxtaposed with the story of Jubilee throughout the film is another account—of Nigeria’s oil economy. A vivid example of crumbled state legitimacy, Nigeria is consistently ranked one of the most corrupt countries in the world—Nigerian officials have stolen hundreds of billions of dollars, much of it oil money. Though their country is one of the world’s largest oil exporters, the Nigerian people are worse off since oil was discovered over 50 years ago.

As the camera pans over the Niger Delta, the heart of Nigeria’s oil production, a dilapidated houseboat floating by and families gathered on ramshackle huts along the water illustrate the grim reality of many Nigerian citizens. In moments, the film crew is face-to-face with a group of angry, masked men with AK-47s. The effect is startling, but the viewer soon learns that this abject poverty is their reality too—made all the more bitter as oil pipelines in their backyard pump billions of dollars into the pockets of crooked politicians and foreign investors.

Motivated by the country’s stark social inequality, militant groups like this one known as the “Deadly Underdogs” have been sabotaging oil pipelines since 2005, demanding a share of the profits for the people of the Niger Delta. Boynton has a candid interview with one of its members. Wearing a ski mask and absently shuffling cartridges in his hand, he beams as he speaks of how deeply he loves his son. “He can do better,” he declares. “That is why we are in this struggle.”

The decline of this nearby African nation is depicted as a cautionary tale for Ghana’s budding relationship with oil—the “resource curse” realized. And while the backdrop of Nigeria’s escalating violence seemed somewhat heavy-handed and overly didactic at times, it remains a tangible representation of what can happen when state corruption and greed go unchecked. Themes of avarice and self-interest are evident throughout the film, reflected both in the story of oil in Nigeria as well as the plot surrounding Jubilee.

As the film winds up, the viewer feels poised to condemn the big-money men in suits as they chuckle about billions in “net cash” and make appearances in Ghana to shake
Juxtaposed with the story of Jubilee is another account—of Nigeria’s oil economy. A vivid example of crumbled state legitimacy, Nigeria is consistently ranked one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Though their country is one of the world’s largest oil exporters, the Nigerian people are worse off since oil was discovered over 50 years ago.

hands with hopeful citizens. But the film has a way of portraying its characters, revealing them—virtues and shortcomings—in a way that is distinctly humanizing. Boynton allows them to speak for themselves. Before we can dismiss Jim as a corporate villain, the viewer accompanies him on a personal tour of the Musselman Ranch as he wistfully shares his dream of giving his children more than he received.

His sentiments echo those of the Nigerian Underdog who speaks of his son, both men articulating a desire to create a legacy for themselves and for their children. The viewer empathizes with Jim as he is demoted and watches his company achieve its dreams, his dreams, with someone else at the helm. But the sting goes both ways—Jim’s resentment happens just after he fires George Owusu, the Ghanaian businessman who made Jubilee possible for Kosmos, in an attempt to save face during an international investigation on corrupt practices.

A running theme throughout the film is the notion of “big men” and what it means to be “big.” During an intimate gathering in the home of a Nigerian king, Boynton offers her observation that many people in Nigeria want to become “big men.” The king swiftly responds by pointing his finger back at her, “You too want to become big,” he says. “Nigerians are not an exception. Everybody wants to become big . . . . It is an instinct in every human being.”

Notably and true to its name, save for two women interviewed briefly and the voice of Boynton throughout, the film depicts a cast exclusively of men, raising questions of exclusion. The viewer is left wondering why more women aren’t part of the corporate or government side of the conversation—whether this was an oversight or a reflection of reality. Similarly, toward the end of the film are a handful of interviews with Ghanaian citizens sharing their sentiments regarding their country’s oil dealings. Revealing though brief, the snapshots almost have the effect of a post-script, raising their voices after omitting them from the main storyline with its focus on the “big men” of business and government.

Perhaps the omission is representative, however. While the government claims to be looking out for its people, the truth remains to be seen. Norway is raised as an example of a successful oil endeavor early in the film when a Norwegian representative is invited to speak in Ghana. His advice to the country is simple: remember that Ghana’s resources belong, first and foremost, to the Ghanaian people—and tax foreign investors accordingly. Musselman laughs this off and it’s the last we hear of it.

As the film winds to a close, Ghana’s future remains uncertain. Themes of divisive self-interest as a motivating factor are woven throughout the narrative and arise once more in a closing interview with a Ghanaian oil executive. He believes this urge is not an intrinsic human quality and his sentiment suggests a trace of hope in an otherwise seemingly grim outlook for Ghana’s oil future.

In sum, the film is dynamic and suspenseful, compelling in its coverage. It presents the story of big oil in Africa in a way that reflects the nuanced nature of the subject. Its reflection of reality is as insightful as it is troubling, and it is worth watching.

Big Men is available on Vimeo here.

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The decline of this nearby African nation is depicted as a cautionary tale for Ghana’s budding relationship with oil—the “resource curse” realized.
Conflicts of the Future: A Snapshot

The following figures and quotes describe the bleak scenario our world is moving toward. Yet, as the articles in this issue suggest, there are alternatives to these eventualities and ways to forge a path to peace.

**ILICIT ECONOMIC ACTIVITY**

FIGHTING TRANSNATIONAL CRIME MUST MEAN MORE THAN CURBING THE TRAFFIC OF DRUGS, WEAPONS AND PEOPLE;

IT MUST ALSO INVOLVE PREVENTING AND REVERSING THE CRIMINALIZATION OF GOVERNMENTS.

The illegal economy obeys no laws except the law of the strong, the corrupt, and the criminal; impunity, coercion, lawlessness, unrest and violence reign.

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The UN Development Programme Human Development Report, 2014.

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For minority and indigenous groups, the most progressive developments are emerging in the form of new national land policies in Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan, which have the potential to create harmony and effectively manage land conflicts.

**COMPETITION OVER NATURAL RESOURCES**

NO COUNTRY WILL BE IMMUNE TO THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE.


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The following figures and quotes describe the bleak scenario our world is moving toward. Yet, as the articles in this issue suggest, there are alternatives to these eventualities and ways to forge a path to peace.

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Agricultural production will need to double to meet basic human needs.

Minerals, ores, fossil fuels, and biomass consumption will triple.

WATER NEEDS WILL INCREASE BY 50%.

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The most politically unstable countries are critical to overcoming the sense of injustice, vulnerability and exclusion that can fuel social discontent.

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