Our Clarifying Moment: A Global Call To Action
Combat Mis/Disinformation and Promote Cybersecurity in Ukraine and Globally
Russia is fighting the conflict in Ukraine and destabilizing other countries through technology, including cyber-attacks and mis/disinformation. Between December 2021 and December 2023, an estimated 3,225 cyberattacks and operations were carried out in connection to the war in Ukraine—an average of 29 attacks per week. Many of these attacks had destructive impacts on critical sectors and platforms, such as Ukrainian government websites, energy and telecommunication service providers, financial institutions, and media outlets.
Russia has also been using mis- and disinformation across the internet and social media to sow confusion and destabilization in Ukraine and allied countries. As of February 2024, NewsGuard identified 470 websites that are “actively spreading Russian disinformation about the war.” The rapid evolution of generative artificial intelligence (AI) that can create cheap and convincing disinformation at a massive scale has serious implications for Russia’s capacity to conduct information warfare. A study published in fall 2023—which examined 5,000 tweets in the first seven months of 2022—found that AI-generated deepfakes are creating confusion among the public and media, as well as eroding trust that online users had in online discussions of the war.
Since the Russian invasion began, Meta imposed measures to prevent the dissemination of Russian propaganda about the conflict and removed dozens of sham websites and hundreds of fake social media accounts. However, alternative social media platforms frequently used by the U.S. far-right have become new breeding grounds for the spread of disinformation about the conflict. Twitter may be banned in Russia, but verified users who purchased the “Blue Check” continue to widely promote misinformation and disinformation across the platform.
As noted by the Biden Administration, enhanced and collective action by the international community is essential to stem further instability caused by Russia’s deployment of technology as a weapon of war both in Ukraine and beyond.
Immediate actions needed:
International institutions and donors must address the proliferation of mis/disinformation campaigns by Russia through substantial funding for multifaceted programming aimed at media literacy, evidence-based counter-messaging strategies, and proactive identification of potential dis/misinformation threats in Ukraine, other conflict-affected countries, the U.S., and other donor countries.
The international community must sustain efforts to push back against Russia’s destabilizing mis/disinformation campaigns. The U.S. and its allies must continue to rebuff Russian efforts by releasing intelligence reports about Russia’s actions in Ukraine and working to get this information into Russia.
Donors, governments, international institutions, civil society, and the private sector must coordinate to create standards and guardrails against the use of AI, especially AI-generated disinformation, to drive the conflict in Ukraine. These same actors should also lean into positive uses of AI for conflict and atrocity prevention and peacebuilding in Ukraine, such as AI-enhanced early warning early response mechanisms, facilitation of real-time dialogue with large groups across communities in the region, and AI-powered, large-scale, rapid identification of Russian disinformation.
Donors, governments, institutions, civil society, and individuals should share guides and disinformation tools and resources with media contacts and others to ensure responsible reporting and prevent the unintended spread of mis/disinformation. They must also support local organizations doing real-time fact-checking, debunking, and prebunking, which serve as a powerful implement in countering mis/disinformation.
Donors, governments, institutions, and civil society should leverage Ukraine’s uniquely advanced levels of digital-literate professionals and work with women, youth, and local communities to build digital resilience to Russia’s information and cyber-attacks, through frameworks such as the EUvsDisinfo platform. With a specific focus on diverse Ukrainian youth, donors should support capacity strengthening on conflict transformation, nonviolent action, digital resilience, and the development of nonviolent counternarratives in cooperation with local, national, and digital media.
Donors, governments, institutions, civil society, and individuals must work to provide cybersecurity assistance and build up cybersecurity capacity and resilience—including through digital hygiene training and data protection—for civil society and aid organizations facing Russian cyberattacks.
Donors, governments, institutions, civil society, and individuals should provide free, open-sourced, and capacity-building tools—similar to the work of The Plunk Foundation—for individuals and civil society in Ukraine to securely store files and communicate without fear of Russian cyber intrusion.
Donors must specifically support civil society organizations and actors documenting war crimes and human rights abuses to promote data security and expedite authentication as Russia continues to try to destroy evidence and undermine investigations.
Following research findings that Russian cyber actors are conducting cyberattacks alongside military attacks, technology companies and the private sector must take more aggressive action to rebuff cybersecurity threats and monitor, identify, and remove mis/disinformation, in the way that Microsoft intervened to address Russian-imposed malware on Ukrainian government and financial institutions.
Social media platforms must apply and enforce policies that consistently and urgently label and remove propaganda and mis/disinformation from Russia, including content released before they imposed restrictions, to prevent its spread and proliferation by actors beyond Russia. These companies must also put safeguards in place to ensure they do not profit from Russian mis/disinformation. Social media entities must also find creative ways to allow the stream of unsanitized, non-state-media news and information into Russia to push back against the Kremlin’s narrative surrounding the war.
The international community and international civil society must continue to pressure crucial private sector actors, such as SpaceX, to maintain telecommunications assistance to Ukraine amid the conflict through Starlink satellite services.